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Emergency management in the United States has evolved over the past century into a 
complex network of organizations and relationships that spans all levels of government 
and the private sector.  Generally, emergency management can be defined as “managerial 
strategies directed toward coping with emergencies, regardless of their cause, duration, 
scope, or frequency” (Drabek, Tamminga, Kilijanek, & Adams, 1981, p. 4).  Those 
managerial strategies can be classified by the phase in which they are implemented: 
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.  Mitigation activities are those 
activities that are meant to reduce the impact of an event (Clary, 1985).  Mitigation 
activities include public education and building codes.  Preparedness activities are 
enacted prior to an event and meant to help manage the event (Clary, 1985).  
Preparedness includes putting warning systems and emergency plans in place.  Response 
activities are those activities under taken during and immediately after an event (Clary, 
1985).  Response includes activities such as search and rescue operations and sheltering.  
Recovery activities are those long-term reconstruction and normalization projects that 
occur after response (Clary, 1985).  It is important to remember that the boundaries 
between the four phases of emergency management are neither as distinct nor as simple 
as presented here.  They each include a wide range of activities that are necessary to
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manage a disaster event.  They may also influence each other (Clary, 1985; Lewis, 1988; 
Mileti, 1999; Waugh Jr. & Sylves, 2002). 
In the United States’ system of federalism, the lowest level of government will 
respond to an incident.  In the case of emergency response, this is local government, 
which can include municipal government, county government, or special district 
government (Waugh Jr., 2007a).  The focus of this paper is how local governments 
interact using networks to respond to a multijurisdictional event.  Emergency events 
rarely affect a single local jurisdiction, so it is important to understand how local 
governments interact during the response phase (Rubin, 2007).  In many communities 
special entities such as colleges and universities add another level of complexity to the 
interorganizational nature of emergency response.  A university adds another level of 
complexity because they present a unique set of concerns including science labs and large 
spectator events such as athletic events.  These entities also include large residential 
populations that must be considered during an emergency event.  Another factor that 
leads to greater complexity is that public universities are not considered to be 
jurisdictions.  They are considered state agencies in many instances.  Because of these 
factors, the relationship between a municipal government and the university located 
within its jurisdiction represents a unique interorganizational relationship that must be 
considered during response.  To date there has been little to no research regarding this 
unique relationship.  The research presented in this paper hopes to fill this gap in the 
research by describing one city-university relationship in a case study.   
The significance of this research is that it begins to describe another facet of 
emergency response in the U.S.  Despite the uniqueness of the relationship between a 
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municipality and a university, the way each responds to an emergency event is likely to 
be influenced by the same factors.  Local government response can be defined by two 
sets of demands: agent-generated demands and response-generated demands (Dynes, 
Quarantelli, & Kreps, 1981; Lewis, 1988; Rotanz, 2007).  Agent-generated demands are 
dependent on the type and scope of the event.  They also depend on the values, norms, 
and available technology of the community (Lewis, 1988).  Agent-generated demands 
occur both before and after the impact of an event.  Pre-impact agent-generated demands 
begin with warning.  Many events allow for some time to warn citizens of the intensity, 
duration, and scope of the event (Dynes et al., 1981).  Warnings are used to lessen human 
and property loss of the event.  The second pre-impact agent-generated demand is pre-
impact preparations.  Pre-impact preparation occurs after a warning has been issued.   
Activities included in this demand can include preparing resources, activating emergency 
operations plans, and taking steps to limit the damage of the event (Dynes et al., 1981).  
The final pre-impact agent-generated demand is evacuation, which is an extension of pre-
impact preparation (Lewis, 1988).   
Post-impact agent-generated demands include activities to begin to the 
normalization process.  The first of these demands is search and rescue.  Search and 
rescue involves locating, rescuing, and transporting trapped citizens (Dynes et al., 1981).  
Another post-impact agent-generated demand is the care of the injured or dead.  
Activities under this demand include moving injured rapidly away from the scene of the 
event, setting up a triage system, removing the dead, identifying the dead, notifying the 
family of the dead, certifying cause of death, releasing bodies to family members, and 
burial (Dynes et al., 1981).  Welfare demands – a post-impact agent-generated demand – 
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are activities to provide food, clothing, shelter, and other basic needs to those affected by 
an event (Dynes et al., 1981).  The restoration of essential community services is also a 
post-impact agent-generated demand.  In order for a community to effectively respond to 
and recover from an event, it must restore gas, power, water, and transportation systems 
to minimum functioning levels (Dynes et al., 1981).  In addition to providing assistance 
to citizens and restoring essential functions, there are two agent-generated demands to 
provide protection.  The first of these demands is protection against continuing threats.  
After the impact of an event, hazards such as damaged buildings, downed power lines, 
aftershocks, rockslides, and fire are created as a result of the event (Dynes et al., 1981).  
There is also the demand to protect or maintain community order, which includes 
guarding property, directing traffic, and ensuring that resources are used for the public 
good (Dynes et al., 1981).   
Response-generated demands are different than agent-generated demands in that 
they are not unique to the event (Rotanz, 2007).  This more general set of demands will 
be faced in all types of events and throughout the response period (Lewis, 1988).  The 
first response-generated demand is communications.  Communications are necessary for 
and effective emergency response because information is important to every action taken 
during the event (Dynes et al., 1981).  Information about the nature of the event, the 
impact area, resources needed in the field, resources available, and other information are 
necessary to meet event-generated demands.  Effective communications and information 
flow are also important to coordinating the response.  It cultivates good relationships 
between the government and the public, within the government, and also between 
different response organizations (Dynes et al., 1981).  Information is also important to 
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maintaining situational awareness, which is another response-generated demand.  
Response organizations are under constant pressure to be aware of how the response is 
progressing.  This involves information about which organizations have been dispatched, 
what resources are available, what resources have been requested and by whom, what 
resources have been authorized and to whom, and what actions have been taken (Dynes 
et al., 1981). Without this information response organizations will not be prepared to take 
the next action.  The demand for situational awareness is constant because the context of 
the event is ever changing.  In other words, the response effort is ever changing.  In every 
event, human and material resources will be mobilized and utilized, which makes it a 
response-generated demand (Dynes et al., 1981).  In terms of human resources, 
organizations active in response must recruit, train, and mobilize its members and/or 
volunteers.  Material resources must be acquired, inventoried, maintained, and allocated 
in an effective way (Dynes et al., 1981).  This is also a constant demand because as 
resources are allocated and new requests are logged the inventory of human and material 
resources must be updated and reviewed.   
The demands discussed thus far involve some need for coordination (Dynes et al., 
1981).  This response-generated demand is needed for effective collective action to take 
place during the response phase.  In order for effective response to occur many 
organizations and individuals must work together to meet the demands discussed 
previously.  These actors may even be called upon to perform duties that are outside their 
everyday mission, but because they have the resources or skill-set necessary they are 
called on.  For this to occur there must be some coordination.  Coordination is also 
necessary in the request and allocation of resources.  In order for coordination to occur, 
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there must be some sense of control and authority between response actors (Dynes et al., 
1981; Wenger, Quarantelli, & Dynes, 1986).  In other words, there must be a system of 
who is in charge and who has responsibility.  That authority and control must also be 
legitimate in the eyes of other actors.  In most cases, the emergency manager assumes 
this legitimate seat of control and authority over the entire process, but other forms of 
control and authority exist within the response phase.  Some actors gain control and 
authority because they possess some technical expertise, others because they have 
disaster experience.   Some use an information advantage to gain authority and control.  
This authority and control is legitimated by those same factors (Dynes et al., 1981).   
The discussion of local response does not end with the demands of the response 
phase.  There is also the question of how local government meets those demands.  In 
other words what are organizational and interorganizational factors that lead to an 
effective response.  Sorensen, Mileti, and Copenhaver (1985) list seven organizational 
factors that are needed for an effective response.  The first of these factors is 
normativeness, which refers to the way an organization functions during an event.  If an 
organization is able to function similarly during an event as it would during day-to-day 
activities the response will be more effective.  Put another way, the less an organization 
has to shift its roles and functions during an event the more effective the response 
(Sorensen et al., 1985).  The second factor – flexibility – is linked to normativeness.  
During the response to an event some organizations will have to shift roles and functions, 
so those organizations that are flexible enough to shift will respond more effectively than 
those that cannot (Sorensen et al., 1985).   
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Another organizational factor that determines the effectiveness of response is 
work definition.  Each member of an organization must know what the mission of the 
organization is with regards to the response.  They must also know their role within the 
larger organization and mission.  The response will be more effective when the roles of 
organizations and their members are clearly defined and understood (Sorensen et al., 
1985).  Effective response also requires adequate resources.  This involves each 
organization knowing the amount and types of material and human resources they will 
have during an event (Sorensen et al., 1985).   
Information and communications are very important to effective organizational 
response.  As stated previously information is needed in all response activities, so in 
order for response to be effective organizations must be able to communicate and share 
information both within and outside of their own organizations (Sorensen et al., 1985).  
The sixth factor of effective organizational response is organizational legitimation.  
Organizational legitimation refers to an organization’s claim to authority and control 
during the response (Sorensen et al., 1985).  If other response organizations do not 
believe that authority and control is legitimate, they will not respect it.  When this occurs 
response is not effective.  The final factor of effective organizational response is internal 
cohesion.  In order for an organization to effectively respond to an event the members of 
the organization must display commitment, group cohesion, and a lack of role conflict 
(Sorensen et al., 1985).   
Sorensen, Mileti, and Copenhaver (1985) reviewed the literature and found that 
the various factors affecting the effectiveness of interorganizational response fall into 
four categories.  The first category is domain consensus and role specification.  This 
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category involves each organization knowing about not only its own role during the 
response, but also the role of the other organizations involved in the response (Sorensen 
et al., 1985).  In addition to clear roles there must also be clear lines of authority between 
the organizations involved in response.  These clear lines of authority help to resolve 
conflict during the response.   
The second category of factors related to interorganizational response 
effectiveness is integration.  Integrating the diverse set of organizations involved in 
response into an effective response team can be difficult, but it can be done.  Integration 
during the response to an event is much more likely if organization interact in their 
normal day-to-day activities (Sorensen et al., 1985).  Another factor that leads to better 
integration is overlapping membership between organizations.  These boundary-spanning 
members lead to better interaction, communication, and coordination between 
organizations (Sorensen et al., 1985).  Another way to integrate organizations is by 
forming resource linkages.  The sharing of resources can lead to other types of sharing, 
which increases integration (Sorensen et al., 1985).  Overall, integration of organizations 
into an effective interorganizational response requires prior planning and work.  
Integration does not just occur when an event occurs.  It must be fostered over time.  But, 
integration leads to better coordination, which leads to a more effective response 
(Sorensen et al., 1985).   
The third factor leading to an effective interorganizational response is 
communication.  Communication between organizations during the response is essential 
to coordinating the response (Sorensen et al., 1985).  Communication is important 
because information is important.  In the previous discussions of response demands and 
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the intraorganizational factors of an effective response, the need for accurate information 
has been thoroughly discussed.   However, it is worth repeating that information is 
necessary during every stage of response.  In many cases, one organization has 
information that is needed by other organizations involved in response, but if there are no 
lines of communication between the organizations, an information gap forms.  
Information gaps lead to an ineffective response.   
The final set of factors related to an effective interorganizational response is 
autonomy maintenance.   During response not all organizations can have the same 
amount of control and authority as they would have during day-to-day operations.  If 
organizations do not enter the response with this in mind, some will try to maintain the 
same level of autonomy. This can cause difficulties during the response.  Organizations 
must understand that small losses of autonomy during the response maybe necessary to 
ensure an effective response (Sorensen et al., 1985).  
The combination of the intra- and interorganizational factors of effective response 
led Sorensen, Mileti, and Copenhaver (1985) to set forth three principles that will lead to 
cohesive, effective disaster response.  The first is organizations need to know what their 
role in the response is and who is to carry out that role.  Second, the integration of 
organizations is necessary.  Lastly, organizations must be flexible during the response.  
The combination also led the researchers to establish a framework for explaining 
effective response.  In general the framework shows that organizational characteristics 
and prior planning affect both the intra- and interorganizational factors of the response 
network.  The response network in turn affects the comprehensiveness and cohesiveness 
of the response (Sorensen et al., 1985).   
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In the preceding discussion of the factors that lead to an effective response, 
coordination was important both within organizations and between organizations.  
Coordination is also an important response-generated demand.  The emphasis on 
coordination during response leads to questions about how local governments can foster 
better coordination.   In his classic article “Managing the Emergency Response,” Drabek 
(1985) proposes six strategies for enhancing intergovernmental coordination during 
disaster response.  These strategies were the product of interviews with top managers 
from each of the organizations that made up six different emergency response networks.  
The interviewees revealed that a lack of interagency communication was the key 
operational problem during the response phase of their events.  The communications 
failures were not simply technical failures though.  They occurred in three different ways.  
In the first there was simply too much information to process.  There were also horizontal 
and vertical communications gaps within the networks.  In other words, there were 
communications failures between officials at the same level of government – horizontal 
gaps.  There were also failures between different levels of government – vertical gaps.  
The final communication failure was due to no single agency being responsible for the 
flow of messages.  But Drabek (1985) argues that the lack interagency coordination not 
communication was the real failure in the networks.   
The first strategy for enhancing intergovernmental coordination involves viewing 
community disaster planning as a process not a product (Drabek, 1985).  He states that in 
jurisdictions that viewed planning as a process, “the roles and relationships among the 
responding participants were clearest and coordination frequently was highest” (Drabek, 
1985, p. 88).  These clear roles and relationships lead to a stronger network – one with a 
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better capacity to respond to a wider range of events. The second strategy is related to 
emergency warning systems.  Drabek (1985) argues that improving the capacity of local 
warning systems will reduce the need for large-scale search and rescue responses in 
future events.   
The third strategy involves improving coordination through structural 
improvements such as an emergency operations center (EOC). According to Drabek 
(1985), EOCs can improve intergovernmental coordination by serving as 
communications hubs.  They are a central location where all information can be gathered, 
disseminated, and passed along to appropriate organizations both at the scene and within 
the EOC.  He also states, “no other structural element contributed as much to the degrees 
of coordination attained.” (Drabek, 1985, p. 90) 
A fourth strategy is to conduct community disaster exercises.  These exercises 
must be based in reality, but they should also allow participants to improvise and respond 
to unanticipated situations.  The fifth strategy is to be aware of multiagency decision 
styles.  This is important because disasters and emergencies change the way decisions are 
made by changing the decision-making environment.  In non-emergency situations, an 
organization’s decision-making can be unitary and decentralized, but when that 
organization is responding to an emergency with other organizations the decision-making 
environment becomes multi-lateral and more centralized.  The precise process of 
deciding in this environment cannot be laid out, but according to Drabek (1985), it must 
be systematic.   
The last strategy for increasing intergovernmental coordination is to acknowledge 
that recovery decisions will involve many agencies and organizations that are not 
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involved in the other phases.  The recovery phase is not characterized by the urgency that 
is present in the response phase, but the decisions are just as important and just as 
complicated.  Because of this, the process must by systematic and coordinated.  Training, 
exercises and other preparedness activities focused on post-response activities can 
increase coordination. 
The next section of this paper will review the extant literature regarding EOC 
design and operation.  The purpose of this section is to describe the role and importance 
the EOC plays is coordinating local emergency response.  The section also provides 
definitions for terms and concepts that are vital to understanding the results of the 
original research presented in the latter part of the paper.  The next section also presents 
an overview of the literature on networked organizational structures.  The networks 
section of the literature review not only defines networks but also provides a theoretical 
background as to why networked structures are appropriate for the field of emergency 
response.   These two concepts are linked because they form the theoretical backbone of 
one way to improve interorganizational response.  In other words, the concepts described 
in these two sections provide the theoretical basis for the argument that using networks to 
form an integrated interorganizational relationship between two EOCs will encourage a 





REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature regarding EOCs and 
networks.  Research supports the propositions that EOCs encourage a well-coordinated 
emergency response to a multijurisdictional event.  The research also supports the use of 
networks in emergency management.   
Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) 
 As stated by Drabek (1985), an emergency operations center (EOC) is one of the 
most important structures utilized during disaster response because it is the central 
location where response personnel, equipment, communication, and activity is managed 
and coordinated (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003b; Wenger et al., 1986).  In other words, it 
is where the response is coordinated from.  Quarantelli (1978) analyzed EOCs based on 
eight questions: who participates in EOC activities; what is done in the EOC; where the 
EOC activities are carried out; when activities are carried on; how the EOC activities are 
carried out; why EOC activities are done; which problems in EOC operations were 
recognized after an event and; did any overall point run through each specific case 
(Quarantelli, 1978).
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The functions carried out in an EOC during an emergency event fall into six 
general task areas.  The first general task area is coordination.  Coordination involves 
directing the overall response effort by making sure organizations and available resources 
act in concert with one another (Perry, 1995).  This includes making sure that 
organizations are paired with tasks they are most capable of handling (Quarantelli, 1972).  
Coordination during an event generally increases over the course of the response because 
more and more information becomes available as the event progresses (Quarantelli, 
1978).  The early stages of response are notorious for low information flow but increases 
as the event progresses, which leads to more and better coordination. 
 Policymaking is the second general task area of EOCs.  Policymaking involves 
making decisions about the overall community response (Quarantelli, 1972).  These 
decisions generally affect the broad, overall nature of the response not specific 
operational decisions (Perry, 1995).  Quarantelli (1978) argues that policymaking 
generally takes precedence over coordination because there is a perceived pressure to do 
something at the height of an event.  This can lead to making decisions for the sake of 
making decisions (Quarantelli, 1978).   This is can lead to problems in response, 
especially in light of Drabek’s (1985) assertion that coordination is one of the areas of 
failure in emergency management networks during the response to an event. 
 The third general task area is operations.  Operations tasks implement the disaster 
response strategy (Perry, 1995).   They are tasks that are directly related to meeting 
disaster demands (Quarantelli, 1972, 1978).  Much like with policymaking, some 
operations are taken on in order to give the appearance of doing something, but this 
strategy can backfire if a new crisis or situation emerges.  The resources and personnel 
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used during the unnecessary operations might be unavailable during the new situation 
(Quarantelli, 1978).  Another issue related to the operations task area is how to react to 
the changes in response activities over the course of an event (Perry, 1995).  For example, 
in the beginning of an event, search and rescue operations are one of, if not the most, 
important activities, but later in the response sheltering and medical care become 
increasingly important.   
 Information gathering – the fourth general task area – is vital to both the previous 
task areas and those to follow.   Information gathering is meant to determine the scope 
and nature of the event and resulting conditions (Quarantelli, 1972, 1978).  This task is 
not always an initial focus of the response effort, but as discussed above, it can have 
serious impacts on the other task areas.  As with policymaking and operations, there have 
been issues with gathering information simply for the purpose of gathering information 
(Quarantelli, 1978).  In other words, there is either not enough activity in this task area or 
there is too much.  The types of information gathered can be very broad such as 
information about the nature of the event.  Or, the information can be very specific, such 
as information about the effectiveness of response operations.  The information gathered 
could also be used in various ways such as adapting short-term managerial strategies to 
the event (Perry, 1995) or as feedback on how to improve future response activities in the 
long term.   
 The fifth general task area is dispersal of public information.  This task area is 
concerned with informing the news media and the general public about the event and the 
response activities (Perry, 1995).  This task is important because it allows the EOC to 
have a hand in what information is dispersed.  It can help make sure the information is 
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accurate.  If information dispersal occurs in a timely and accurate manner, the EOC 
maintains its legitimacy in the eyes of the public and the media.  This is important 
because the media provides an important buffer between the public and the emergency 
management network (Perry, 1995).  The media also acts to disseminate information for 
the EOC (Wenger et al., 1986).  In many EOCs, the Public Information Officer (PIO) 
handles the dispersal of public information.  The media is usually reserved their own 
room or area within the EOC.   
 Hosting visitors is the sixth and final general task area.  Most emergency 
managers do not expect to receive visitors to the EOC during the response to an event, 
but that is not always the case.  Many times government VIPs and elected officials have 
no disaster related function that requires them to be in the EOC, but they come anyway, 
which can cause conflict between those who are necessary to the disaster response 
(Quarantelli, 1978).  They see these visitors as being distractions or impediments because 
it draws attention away from response operations (Perry, 1995).  It can also exacerbate 
issues with space and noise in the EOC, especially in large disasters where the number of 
visitors is likely to be high.  If available, a public information officer can be tasked to 
escort visitors around the EOC and answer any questions they have about the operation 
(Perry, 1995).   
The external and internal design of the EOC can effect how the EOC functions.  
The reverse is also true.  Because of this it is important to have an understanding of the 
issues surrounding the design of the EOC.  According to Neal (2003), the amount of 
systematic review or empirical information about EOCs is not commensurate with their 
importance in the response phase of emergency management.   
 17 
 The first element of EOC design that should be considered is location.  The author 
notes that both primary EOC location and secondary location should be considered (Neal, 
2003).  Whenever possible, the EOC should be located based on the results of a hazard 
analysis.  This rarely happens though because many jurisdictions do not have the 
resources to conduct a hazard analysis.  Usually, the EOC is located where a jurisdiction 
has space to spare (Neal, 2003).  They are also generally located near other governmental 
agencies, which can make them more vulnerable to certain kinds of hazards.  If the 
location of the EOC cannot be easily controlled or changed, there are steps that can be 
taken to make the building less susceptible.  For example, the Smith County Texas EOC 
was designed and constructed post-September 11 (using FEMA funds) to include a roof 
and exterior walls hardened to resist tornadoes and high wind, the lobby was designed to 
minimize the effects of explosions, multiple security access levels, and a special media 
area (FEMA, nd).  Neal (2003) outlines the recommendations for site location in a guide 
issued by the state of Ohio.  These recommendations include: 
• A location that minimizes the effects of local hazards; 
• A location that does not change or alter national historic sites or structures; 
• A location that is not in the 100-year flood plain; and 
• A place close to government offices.   
Once the primary EOC is located, a jurisdiction must consider options for 
secondary or back up EOC.  The back up EOC will be activated in the event the primary 
EOC is not operational.  Many of the same conditions apply to the location of the back up 
EOC that apply to the primary EOC.  Without a back up EOC, jurisdictions might be 
forced to compose an ad hoc EOC after an event, much like happed in New York City 
 18 
just after the attacks of September 11 that destroyed the city’s EOC (Kendra & 
Wachtendorf, 2003b; Neal, 2003).   
The New York City EOC was located in Building 7 of the World Trade Center 
(7WTC) complex prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, but when the second plane 
struck, the building was evacuated (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003b).  The evacuation of 
7WTC caused serious complications in the response effort because the central 
coordinating function of the EOC was disrupted.  Prior to September 11, the New York 
City EOC was one of the most technologically and functionally capable EOCs in the U.S.  
The operations room was equipped with 68 agency workstations arranged into groups – 
known as pods – based on their function in the response (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003b).  
There was also space to expand the operations area to facilitate 40 more agency 
workstations.  In terms of communications, the EOC was outfitted with a computer 
messaging system, a phone system with microwave back up, separate systems for fire, 
police, and EMS, video monitoring of New York’s waterways, traffic monitoring of city 
streets, and geographic information systems (GIS) software packages (Kendra & 
Wachtendorf, 2003b).   
The EOC was designed to meet almost any anticipated need, save one, the event 
when the EOC needed to be evacuated.  New York City had no pre-determined back-up 
EOC.  When 7WTC, and the EOC, were evacuated on September 11, there was no 
redundancy of emergency operations (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003b).  In other words, 
emergency management officials had to not only respond to the event, they also had to 
reconstitute an EOC.  Because the evacuation occurred so quickly, emergency managers 
and EOC staff had no chance to save any equipment or documentation (Kendra & 
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Wachtendorf, 2003b).  Over the next two days, ad hoc EOCs were setup at various 
locations.  First officials relied on a mobile EOC then the library of the Police Academy 
and a high school.  These arrangements were not sufficient, but they had to make due.  
On September 13, the EOC was moved to a cruise ship at Pier 92 on the Hudson River 
(Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003b).  This new facility would be the city’s EOC until 
February 2002.   
The new EOC at Pier 92 was very effective for the remainder of the time it was 
utilized.  The Pier 92 EOC was much more than a back up EOC though.  It was almost 2 
city blocks long EOC that facilitated one of the largest emergency response and recovery 
operations in U.S. history (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003b).  The new operations area was 
equipped with worktables, copy machines, maps, charts, and over 200 networked 
computers.  The space was arranged in the same pod arrangement as the EOC at 7WTC 
but contained more agency workstations that could fit in the original space (Kendra & 
Wachtendorf, 2003b).  The creation of the new EOC over the period of 48-72 hours 
represents an amazing feat of organizational resilience.   
According to Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003b, pg 41) resilience is the “ability to 
sustain a shock without completely deteriorating.”  The emergency managers and EOC 
staff sustained the shock of losing their well designed and well equipped EOC by creating 
a nearly equivalent EOC on a cruise ship at Pier 92.  They did so because the 
organizational aspects of the EOC displayed adaptive behavior, improvisation, focused 
on goals, and incorporated resources from many sources (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 
2003b).  These officials relied on the emergency response capacities of New York City to 
rebuild the EOC.  New York City’s emergency response networks rivals that of some 
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states, so the resources and capacity housed within the city was invaluable.  The city also 
relied on previous relationships.  Officials within the city’s Office of Emergency 
Management called upon personal contacts made during training, meetings, and 
conferences to provide those resources they could not secure within the city (Kendra & 
Wachtendorf, 2003b).  New York City emergency managers and EOC staff were able to 
reconstitute the EOC in such an effective manner because there was an emphasis on 
developing the capacity for adaptation prior to the events of September 11.  The 
emergency operations staff had participated in extensive training and exercises that 
prepared them to work collaboratively and adaptively (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003b).  
While not every city will have the resources and capabilities of New York City, they do 
have the ability to promote resiliency and adaptability, which were key in the 
reconstitution of the EOC in New York City in the days following September 11.   
During the selection of an EOC location, it is important to remember the amount 
of space that will be needed to run an effective EOC.  When many people think of an 
EOC they imagine it as a single room with maps, computers, and communications 
systems, but it is more than that (Neal, 2003).  An EOC also includes offices for the day-
to-day EOC staff, conference room/s, a media area, a kitchen or break room, bathrooms, 
and storage spaces.  The Smith County Texas facility also includes room and equipment 
for 25 people to sleep at the EOC, enough food to feed 50 people for up to two weeks, 
washers and dryers, and separate dressing rooms with showers (FEMA, nd).  Neal (2003) 
also states that there is a lack of empirical evidence showing how these rooms should be 
arranged or integrated into the larger design of the EOC. 
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Once the physical location has been selected and the rooms designated, the 
internal design of the EOC must be considered.  The internal design is often focused on 
the main operation room of the larger structure or location because this area is where 
coordination and decision making occurs (Neal, 2003).  The internal design of an EOC 
must consider seating arrangements, physical installations, noise, room capacity, and 
overcrowding.  The arrangement of desks and seating in the EOC has been classified into 
five general patterns (Paxton, 1980).  Participants seated facing the front of the EOC 
characterize the first arrangement, known as the classroom style (Neal, 2003).  The key 
decision makers are seated at the front of the room in this style.  The arc style, on the 
other hand, involves the participants forming a backwards C around the decision makers 
(Neal, 2003).  The U-shape style is similar to the arc style, but in the U-shape style, the 
key decision makers sit at the bottom of the “U” (Neal, 2003).  The T-shape style is 
characterized by an upside down “T”.  The key decision makers sit along the bottom of 
the “T” facing the other participants who sit along the vertical part of the “T” (Neal, 
2003).  The last pattern is based on the National Response Plan’s (NRP) Emergency 
Support Functions (ESF).  The cluster style involves a table or group of tables for each of 
the ESFs, but the key decision makers would be seated at the front of the room facing not 
the other participants but the information boards (Neal, 2003).  Even though these five 
patterns are present, there is little research on which design is the best or which works 
best in different situations.  Neal (2003) and Quarantelli (1978) argue that it is important 
to keep in mind the influence seating arrangements can have on organizational structure 
and flexibility in the EOC.   
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 The seating arrangement in the EOC is linked to the physical installations in the 
EOC.  Some EOCs are simple rooms with tables, chairs, and phones, but others, like the 
Smith County Texas facility, are technologically complex facilities (FEMA, nd; Neal, 
2003).  Generally, the physical resources – maps, phones, radios, and desks – plus the 
central location facilitate the EOC’s ability to coordinate disaster response.  But, these 
resources are not generally placed within the EOC in a way that will minimize noise and 
overcrowding and maximize space and the flow of people and information.  This is 
alarming because other researchers such as Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003a) have noted 
that EOC’s designed to facilitate the flow of information both within the EOC and 
externally is essential.   
Noise is considered by many to be one of the most important physical problems 
within the EOC (Neal, 2003).  The noise problem derives from people talking, phones 
ringing, keyboards, TVs, and radios.  Even though noise is a common concern there has 
been very little research on how to reduce the amount of noise in the EOC (Neal, 2003).  
The amount of noise could be reduced by reducing the number of people in the EOC, but 
that is difficult considering most participants who are in the EOC are necessary to the 
disaster response.  Space planning might be one way to improve traffic flow and reduce 
noise.  As noted by Neal (2003), the state of Ohio recommends there be 30 square feet 
per person available in the EOC.  They also recommend that there be space available for 
one or two representatives from each agency.  But, space planning will only work if the 
number of people present in the EOC is fixed.  Overall, Neal (2003) concludes that there 
needs to be more systematic research on the physical attributes of EOCs.  Once there is a 
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more complete view of these physical attributes, there can be more analysis of how these 
attributes are linked to the performance of the EOC. 
 In addition to his review of the literature concerning EOC design, Neal (2005) 
also conducted an analysis of four EOCs in central Alabama. Three of the EOCs served 
counties.  The fourth EOC is part of a military installation that includes a firing range and 
is next to a chemical weapons storage facility (Neal, 2005).  These four EOCs were 
evaluated in terms of their location, the presence of a back up EOC, space and layout, 
operations room configuration, the use of EOC space, noise, and resources.   
According to Neal’s (2005) analysis, convenience and availability are responsible 
for the location of each of the four EOCs.  Neither hazard analysis nor ease of access was 
considered in the site location.  The EOC at the military installation did locate their EOC 
as far away from the chemical storage area though (Neal, 2005).  These four examples 
support Quarantelli’s (1978) argument that opportunity and convenience are the two 
biggest determinants in the site location of EOCs.  Three of the four EOCs have back up 
EOCs in case the main EOC is unusable (Neal, 2005).  The military EOC has an 
agreement with the county EOC, which states that they are the others back up EOC.  Two 
of the county EOCs have mobile operations centers (MOCs) that act as a back up EOC 
(Neal, 2005).  Each of the MOCs has basic communications equipment, computers, 
television, and other pertinent technology.  The MOCs are parked away from the EOC to 
ensure they are not affected by an event at the primary EOC, but not always far enough to 
be completely safe. 
  The four EOCs also differed in how much space they have and how that space is 
arranged.  One EOC consisted of a single room with each wall dedicated to different 
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activities.  The other three had separate rooms for office space, communications, and 
operations (Neal, 2005).  Three of the four used the NRP’s ESFs to decide which 
organizational representatives were in the operations space.  Two EOCs had space for 
sleeping, and three had their own set of restrooms (Neal, 2005).  The configuration of the 
operations room was different in each of the four EOCs.  The non-county EOC used a 
variation of the classroom setting to organize their EOC.  One county EOC, that was 
undergoing renovation at the time of the study, used a hybrid of the cluster and U-shape 
configuration.  Another county EOC had a small operations room where 10-12 people 
can sit comfortably and seemed to be arranged according to ESFs.  The one room EOC 
had a long table in the center of the room that was used as a meeting place for the handful 
of organizational representatives that gathered at the EOC while activated (Neal, 2005).   
Neal’s (2005) analysis also discussed the ways the three largest EOCs tried to 
mitigate the noise problem within their spaces.  One EOC director replaced the ring on 
the EOC’s phones with flashing red lights.  The EOC that was being remodeled at the 
time of the study limited the number of phones in the EOC.  They have also placed a 
room between the communications room and operations room that will serve as a noise 
buffer.  Another of the county EOCs provided headphones for telephone operators, and 
installed baffles, which are meant to reduce noise (Neal, 2005).   Despite these efforts, 
noise will probably continue to be a problem within EOCs especially during operations. 
There are many ways technology is used to improve the emergency management 
network at all levels.  A new way technology is enhancing emergency management is 
through virtual EOCs (VEOCs).  VEOCs are one way that has been suggested to address 
the problems with EOCs discussed above.  An EOC can be considered virtual when 
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functions, such as sharing information, making decisions, and deploying resources, can 
be performed without participants physically being at the EOC (Davis, 2002).  In other 
words the EOC exists and functions in cyberspace.  The VEOC can be spread throughout 
the world, across a city, or between the buildings on a university campus.  VEOCs 
supplement the EOC because certain actors should be present at the EOC, especially 
during extended events.   
Davis (2002) states that the VEOC should have six core functions.  
Communication and intelligence is the first function.  A VEOC should send and receive 
information effectively.  The command and control function is related to the VEOC’s 
ability to implement response and recovery plans (Davis, 2002).  Coordination and 
documentation – the third core function – includes activities such as organizing the 
response and recording the actions taken and their results.  Automated checklists are used 
to that all activities are completed (Davis, 2002).  The fourth core function of a VEOC is 
alert notification, which is important to the flow of information.  Alert notification is 
essentially a way to sort, distribute, and log all the notifications that are received by the 
VEOC.  Media management is the last core function of a VEOC.  Media management 
allows the VEOC to keep the media informed about the event.   
Despite these functions the main purpose of the VEOC is as a center for 
information management.  It should centralize the efforts to gather and disseminate the 
information needed to quickly and effectively plan for and respond to emergencies 
(Davis, 2002).  Davis (2002) states that the software can replace white boards, black 
boards, flipcharts, and pads of paper with electronic data that can be accessed from 
anywhere by participants.  The software could also be used to address the 
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communications failures described by Drabek (1985) by implementing a systematic and 
accessible process for communicating and processing the vast amounts of information 
that is gathered during an emergency event.  The VEOC could also track resource 
allocation information and provide real time briefings on this information to participants 
or the press.   
There are disadvantages to the use of VEOCs, which include issues surrounding 
security, access, buy-in, cost, and the ability to use the technology.  There must be some 
kind of system in place to ensure that the data gathered and stored in the system is not 
accessed by anyone other than those who are authorized.  There must also be a guarantee 
that the information is safe from server or connection failure.  In terms of accessibility, 
there might be problems with all participants having access to a computer at all times and 
being able to connect to the internet.  In the event of a natural disaster, electrical and 
telephone services could be interrupted, which will preclude members from connecting to 
the VEOC.  There is also some question as to whether virtual communication can replace 
face-to-face communication (Kamensky, Burlin, & Abramson, 2004).  The VEOC must 
fit into the emergency management environment of the jurisdiction in order to be utilized 
and work properly.   
Davis (2002) argues that the advantages of VEOCs outnumber the disadvantages.  
He also argues that the disadvantages can be overcome.  One of the major advantages of 
VEOCs is that anyone can participate no matter where they are located.  It makes the 
process of responding to and recovering from an event much more flexible.  Another 
advantage is that VEOCs require less investment than physical EOC sites, both in terms 
of monetary investment but also in terms of infrastructure.  Davis (2002) also states that 
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the VEOCs are designed to be easy to operate.  The last advantage mentioned by the 
author is that in some cases it might be best for participants to stay in their locations or 
roles during an event, such as during a chemical or biological attack. 
As the central point of coordination for emergency response, it is important to 
understand the design and operation of an EOC.  It is also important to remember that the 
design of the EOC can affect how effective the response will be because an ineffective 
EOC will lead to an ineffective response.  In terms of responding to a multijurisdictional, 
the EOC will serve as a central point of contact for other jurisdictions.  The EOC will 
function as the central place where resources are requested and deployed.  If there is to be 
a coordinated multijurisdictional response, there must be coordination and cooperation 
between EOCs.  One way to obtain the cooperation and coordination needed for a 
multijurisdictional response is through networked structures, which are explained in the 
next section.   
Networks 
 The way researchers have defined a network has varied over that time.  This 
variation in definition is generally due to the changing amount of research interest in 
network arrangements.  As the research on networks increased, the definition of a 
network became more precise and also more complicated.  Myrna Mandell (1988, p. 399) 
defines an interorganizational network as, “a number of diverse actions that are 
connected through a specific type of interaction and within a certain context.”  She 
further defines public sector interorganizational networks as having unclear lines of 
authority and control.  Laurence J. O’Toole and Kenneth J. Meier (2004, p. 682) provided 
another definition; they define a network as, “a pattern of interdependence among social 
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actors in which at least a portion of the links are framed in terms of something other than 
superior-subordinate relations.”  They also state that networks can include multiple whole 
organizations or only parts of organizations.  Robert Agranoff (2004, p. 63) provides yet 
another more complex definition, “networks of public organizations, involving formal 
and informal structures, composed of representatives from governmental and 
nongovernmental agencies working interdependently to exchange information and/or 
jointly formulate and implement policies and programs that are usually designed for 
action through their respective organizations.”  
 In terms of emergency management and the EOC, these definitions are very 
appropriate. Emergency management as a field is a network based on the definitions 
provided, even the more complex Agranoff (2004) definition.  Emergency management is 
a cooperative effort among various organizations in both the private and public sectors.  
The organizations share information and work together to make policy that is 
implemented by the independent organizations.  The definition of a network also applies 
more narrowly to the EOC.  An EOC is not only a physical location and space; it also 
represents the organizations and individuals who staff the EOC during an event.  The 
EOC is staffed by a wide range of organizational representatives who work together to 
make decisions and policies in response to an event.  Those decisions and policies are 
then put into action by first responders in the field, by nurses and doctors in hospitals, by 
volunteers at shelters, and by other actors throughout the various aspects of the response 
phase. 
 Networked structures are becoming more numerous in the public sector.  In the 
past there were a few networked structures scattered throughout the whole of the U.S. 
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public sector, but now more and more problems are being addressed in networks.  The 
increased use of networks can be explained in several ways.  The first is the rise of so-
called wicked problems (O'Toole, 1997).  Wicked problems are those very complex 
policy issues that have no easily agreed upon course of action.  They are also ever present 
issues with no permanent solution.  These issues also span organizational boundaries; 
they are addressed by several private and public sector organizations.   In order to combat 
these wicked problems, these organization must work together toward a mutually agreed 
upon goal (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001).  The limits on government involvement can also 
explain the increased use of networks (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004).  Networks allow the 
government to partner with the private sector and non-governmental organizations to 
deliver services and take other action as necessary while still limiting the size of the 
government.  Public opinion calls for government action and small government, so 
networks have increased because they have the ability to meet public expectations.  
Similarly, cross-organization mandates have also spurred the rise in networks (Goldsmith 
& Eggers, 2004).  The government has imposed umbrella mandates such as civil rights 
and environmental rules that affect all agencies within civil service.  Because of these 
cross-organizational mandates, many agencies and organizations have networked 
together to find best practices and solutions for implementing the new mandates.   
 The political nature of policymaking and implementation has necessitated the rise 
of networked structures (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004).  In some cases, in order for new 
programs to be initiated and succeed there must be broad support among many different 
agencies.  To accomplish this broad support, networks are formed.  These same networks 
are then tasked with implementing the new program.  Another explanation for the rise of 
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networks stems from the success of these informal support networks (Goldsmith & 
Eggers, 2004).   Once these informal support networks were shown to be successful they 
were formalized into interagency committees and commissions.   
Within the vast array of network structures present in the public and private 
sectors in the U.S., there are different types of networks.  These types of networks vary in 
terms of scope, purpose, and powers.  Mandell (1988) places networks into categories 
based on permanence: project networks and functional networks.  Project networks are 
temporary networks that are set up to accomplish a specific project or type of project 
(Mandell, 1988).  Project networks can even be formed to carryout a specific purpose that 
includes different types of projects.  Functional networks, on the other hand, are 
permanent and focus on various projects at different times.  Functional networks also 
exist during time when there is not a project to focus on (Mandell, 1988).  Project and 
functional networks are not mutually exclusive.  In other words, they coexist.  In many 
instances they actually influence each other in various ways.  The influence is generally 
due to the members of each network.  When a project network is formed, the members 
are chosen from the broader functional network (Mandell, 1988).  In the context of this 
paper, the field of emergency management is the functional network.  It is an ever-present 
entity that focuses on different projects over time.  The members of the project network – 
the EOC – are chosen from the functional network.  The EOC then exists and functions 
until the project ends.  In this case, the project would be the response phase.     
Agranoff (2004) provides another classification system for networks.  His system 
is based on the scope of the powers given to the network.  The first type – informational 
network– is given the least of amount of power (Agranoff, 2004).  Participants 
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voluntarily exchanging information about policies, programs, problems and solutions 
characterize informational networks.  The participants then decide if and how to use that 
information within their own organizations.  Participants in developmental networks not 
only exchange information they also use education and member service to develop higher 
problem-solving and implementation capacity within in their own agencies (Agranoff, 
2004).  According to Agranoff, the third type of network is known as an outreach 
network.  In an outreach network, the exchange of information and opportunities is 
furthered by adding in the sequencing of programs (Agranoff, 2004).  The 
implementation of the programs designed by the network is still the domain of the 
individual organizations and agencies.  The final type of network described by Agranoff 
is the action network.  Action networks differ from the other three because they have to 
power to act collectively (Agranoff, 2004).  The participating organizations and the 
network share the power to implement decisions made by the network. 
In the field of emergency management, networks come in all of these forms 
depending on the purpose of the network and the environment in which it is operating.  In 
many instances emergency management networks take the first two forms.  The exchange 
of information is extremely important because emergency management is such a varied 
field.  In most cases the likelihood of emergency events is low, so communities rely on 
information and best practices provided by other communities who have endured similar 
events.  This exchange of information occurs within in informational networks.   
Developmental networks take that same idea to another level.  This next level would be 
the network providing training meant to increase the capacity of the members to respond 
to an emergency event.  Outreach networks in emergency management can include those 
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networks that design preparedness programs that are then implemented by the individual 
organizations that participated in the network.  The final type of network – action 
networks – also exist within emergency management.  EOCs are an example of an action 
network because the organizations and individuals that make up the EOC jointly decide 
on a course of action; then the emergency manager and participating organizations share 
the implementation of the course of action.     
 Like any organizational structure, networks have advantages and disadvantages 
that must be weighed by government officials.  Networks are generally seen as being 
more flexible and innovative than traditional, top-down bureaucracies.  Flexibility is 
important to modern government because most policy problems do not lend themselves 
to routine solutions.  Public policy has never been simple, but with the decentralization of 
power and devolution of responsibility to lower levels of government, more flexible 
techniques of resource acquisition and service delivery are necessary.  Networks are not 
bound by bureaucratic norms and standard operating procedures like a traditional 
bureaucracy.  For this reason, they are able to act quickly and flexibly to acquire and 
distribute resources (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004; Kamensky et al., 2004).  Many times 
networks of public and private sector participants are able to use private resources – both 
monetary and non-monetary – to fill gaps in service delivery (Goldsmith & Eggers, 
2004).  Networks are also better equipped to handle shifts in personnel.  In other words, 
networks are able to upsize and downsize much easier than a hierarchy (Goldsmith & 
Eggers, 2004).  This includes not only hiring and firing practices but also assigning and 
reassigning personnel.  The type of flexibility afforded by networks to managers to public 
 33 
managers allows them to more effectively handle changes in demand in the face of hiring 
limits and other personnel policies (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004).  .   
Networks allow local government to collaborate with a variety of entities to 
provide essential services.  Many times local government networks include 
organizational representatives from the private and public sectors, including non-
governmental organizations such as religious organizations and not-for-profits.  The wide 
range of participants leads to a wide range of ideas and solutions for the problem at hand.  
The innovation accomplished by networks is a result of these wide-ranging viewpoints 
and the experimentation that is allowed in network structures (Goldsmith & Eggers, 
2004).  Much like with flexibility, innovation is possible in networks because they are not 
constrained by the same bureaucratic norms, command-and-control culture, and 
centralization of power that constrains innovation with traditional bureaucracies.  Access 
to information and communication are necessary for innovation to work though.  If 
participants cannot or do not share information innovation will be stifled within the 
network.  Citizen reactions are another source of innovation within a network (Goldsmith 
& Eggers, 2004).  A network structure breaks down some of the barriers between 
decision makers and citizens that exist in hierarchical bureaucracies.  Without these 
barriers, decision makers are more aware of the concerns and attitudes of their customers, 
the citizens.  Once again, access to greater amounts of good information leads to more 
innovative decisions (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004).  
The innovation allowed by a networked structure was evident following the 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003a) document several 
forms of creativity that occurred during the response to the attacks.  The attacks and 
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destruction of the city’s EOC created the need for new maps of the impacted area 
(Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003a).  This need was filled by a newly created GIS and map 
distribution area in the Pier 92 EOC.  Another instance of creativity in the aftermath of 
September 11 was the waterborne evacuation of lower Manhattan (Kendra & 
Wachtendorf, 2003a).  In this instance the Coast Guard was instrumental in evacuating 
nearly 500,000 people, who would have otherwise been trapped.  The Coast Guard also 
used vessels to refuel fire trucks (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003a).  One last instance of 
creativity in the aftermath of September 11 is the creation of a new credentialing system 
by emergency operations staff.  Prior to the attacks, the credentialing system used by the 
EOC consisted of specific badges, but those badges were destroyed in 7WTC EOC.  In 
the days and weeks following the attacks, a new system of credentialing evolved from a 
simple color-coated paper name badge to a complex identification card that included a 
person’s name, color photo, agency affiliation, and codes indicating where the person 
was allowed (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003a).  These instances of creativity in the 
aftermath of the attacks of September 11 were facilitated by the networked structure of 
emergency response.   
 Specialization is seen as another advantage of the network structure.  Networks 
allow governmental organizations to focus on their core activities and missions 
(Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004).  In many cases, the network allows private sector and other 
non-governmental actors to take on problems that they are experts at solving.  In the case 
of the emergency management network, the health department would be aided by private 
hospitals, nursing homes, health clinics run by non-governmental organizations.  In a 
similar manner, local businesses, local aid agencies, and churches can assist the Red 
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Cross.  Each participant in the network provides specialization and expertise about a 
specific part of the larger problem of emergency response.   
 Specialization is related to another advantage of networks – increased reach.  
Increased reach refers to a network’s ability to achieve contact with more and varied 
types of organizations and individuals at a much lower cost than a traditional hierarchical 
organization.  Through networks, local governments can cross geographic boundaries, 
share customers, spread technological costs over a larger base, reduce risk, and better use 
experts (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004).  The extended reach of networks also includes 
reaching more customers, which is especially important in emergency response.  
Increased reach, especially toward the private and non-profit sectors, also leads 
governments toward more innovative and flexible solutions to problems. 
 The promotion of social capital is another, less tangible advantage of the network 
organization.  Social capital is seen as necessary for the individual members of networks 
to share resources and knowledge (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Kamensky et al., 2004; 
Lipnack & Stamps, 1994).  More specifically, social capital includes the trust and norms 
that promote the cooperation and coordination necessary for networks to produce results 
(Agranoff & McGuire, 2001).  Without social capital networks would crumble.  They 
would not have the organizational capabilities to be flexible or innovative.  They would 
not have the chance to reach out to other organizations or customers.  They could not 
utilize the expertise of their members.  Social capital is the glue that holds a network 
together.   
 The disadvantages of networks are as numerous as the advantages.  Networks 
must be managed well in order to prove successful.  The first issue network management 
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must confront is goal incongruence, which can be difficult in public sector networks 
(Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004).  Public sector networks are often formed to perform tasks 
or solve problems that are ambiguous or difficult to measure, which can make identifying 
the goals of the network difficult.  In order for goal congruence to be achieved by the 
network, the members must first agree on the goals or outcome.  When participants do 
not agree, goal incongruence can occur.  Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) identify a few 
general types of goal incongruence that occur in public sector networks.   
• When the missions of the participating organizations do not align. (p. 41) 
• When government activates a network but also competes against parts of 
the network. (p. 42) 
• When network participants try to maximize their own interests against the 
government’s will to put the public good first. (p. 42)    
In order to mitigate these problems, participants in government, or public, networks must 
focus on agreeing on the outcomes of the network’s efforts not the processes used by 
each of the participants to achieve goals.  This is not a one-time event that occurs at the 
formation of the network though.  Network participants must continually discuss and 
agree on the goals and outcomes of the network.  Participants must also continually 
remember they are representatives of both the network and their home organization 
(Agranoff, 2004).  This can be difficult but is necessary to mitigate the problems 
associated with goal incongruence.   
 Oversight and accountability are another issue to be confronted when managing a 
network.  Oversight and accountability in a traditional hierarchical organizational 
structure is much more straightforward than in a networked structure.  Agranoff and 
McGuire (2001) explain the differences in two ways.  First they argue that accountability 
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in a networked structure is different because the relationships within the structure are 
different.  In networked structures there is no clear principal-agent relationship present.  
The lack of clear lines of authority is one of the defining characteristics of a networked 
structure (Mandell, 1988).  The second reason accountability in networked structures is 
different than in hierarchical structures is due to the lack of a clear principal-agent 
relationship (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001).  Without this relationship every participant in 
the network is responsible for the activities of the network.  In other words, the 
responsibility is shared in networked structures; where as in hierarchical structures there 
is absolute accountability. 
 Communication breakdowns occur within all organizational structures but they 
are especially devastating in networked structures (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004).  
Communication is an essential linkage between the participants in a networked 
structured.  It allows for the promotion of social capital.  It enables the network to react 
with speed and flexible.  With this said, it can also be difficult to maintain 
communication within a network.  In traditional organizational structures, much of the 
communication occurs informally.  Traditional structures allow for this because actors are 
usually housed in the same building or office.  In networks participants do not have the 
same type of access to each other.  Because networked structures are sometimes lacking 
informal communication between participants, it can take longer to identify and react to 
problems (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004).  Communication breakdowns within a network 
can also occur when participants are using incompatible communication systems.  
 Coordination problems can also develop in networked structures (Goldsmith & 
Eggers, 2004).  A network is not just defined by the structure, but also by the 
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relationships that are present between participants.  By definition, networks include 
participants from various levels of government, the private sector, and non-profit 
organizations working together to share information and/or formulate policy.  In order for 
a network to exist there must be coordination between the participants.  Coordinating the 
activities of these groups can be very difficult, especially when the problem is complex 
and authority is unclear (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004).  Another facet to the coordination 
problem is that a single bad relationship between any two participants can cause shock 
waves within the network (Gillespie & Murty, 1994).  It can derail any real or potential 
progress.  Agranoff (2004) argues that patience and interpersonal skills are necessary for 
the network to be successful.  In other words, the relationships within the network must 
be nurtured and cultivated.  They do not occur instantaneously when the network is 
formed.   
 A shortage of accurate data can also affect the performance of a network 
(Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004).  All organizational structures must contend with a lack of 
accurate data, but in a networked structure the number of linkages makes the problem 
more difficult to remedy.  A lack of accurate data can affect networked structures in 
different ways.  It can affect formation and activation, the decision-making process, and 
performance.  Accurate data is needed to decide if a networked structure is the best 
structure to undertake a certain type of problem.  In the case of emergency management, 
a networked structure emerged due to the disparate organizations and individuals that 
provide essential services before, during, and after an event.  In some other cases, 
governments have chosen from the outset to use a networked structure to address a 
problem.  In order for a networked structure to be successful, the participants must be 
 39 
willing to share information during the decision-making process.  If participants do not 
engage in this way, the network will not have the full range of options, which is one of 
the main advantages of a network.  Choosing appropriate performance measures is 
another way a lack of accurate data can affect a networked structure.  Without accurate 
information about the costs and benefits of services, a network cannot establish 
performance measures (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004).  Without accurate performance 
measures there is no guarantee that the network is performing better than other 
organizational structures.  
 A final challenge of the network in the public sector is a shortage of employees 
with the capacity to manage a networked structure (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004).  Many 
public sector employees are not posses the skills, nor are they trained, to manage within a 
network.  The skills necessary to manage a network are not the same skills needed to 
manage a traditional hierarchical organization.  Managing a networked structure requires 
a wider range of knowledge.  As stated earlier, it also requires more focus on cultivating 
relationships (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004).  Goldsmith & Eggers (2004) argue the 
structure and culture of the civil service in the U.S. is to blame for the capacity shortage.  
The civil service system rewards technical expertise over project management and 
negotiation skills.  This emphasis leads to a personnel gap in networks.   
 In order to maximize the advantages of networks and mitigate the challenges a 
network must be effectively managed. Agranoff (2004) studied several Midwest 
networks to learn about managing in networked structures.  The study allowed network 
managers to reflect on how managing in a network differed from managing a hierarchical 
organization.  After these discussions, he developed ten lessons on how to manage in 
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networks (Agranoff, 2004).  The first lesson is, “Be a representative of your agency and 
the network.” (Agranoff, 2004, p. 92)  This lesson argues that in order for a network to be 
successful the participants must balance their role in their home organization with their 
role in the network.  Most networks do not have administrative staff like traditional 
organizations, so network participants have to share those tasks.  This is lesson two, “ 
Take a share of the administrative burden.” (Agranoff, 2004, p. 94)  The process of 
assigning administrative tasks is generally based on who volunteers, so to maintain 
relationships all members of the network should take their turn with administrative 
duties.   
 Agranoff’s (2004, p. 94) third lesson is, “operate by agenda orchestration.”  When 
networks focus on agenda orchestration they are making sure they remain a collaborative 
organization of managers and organizations.  Goal orchestration helps to ensure the 
activities of the network are purpose driven and goal oriented.  Mandell (1988, p. 401) 
refers to this idea as making sure an interorganizational network works as a “purposive 
whole.”  Lesson four put forth by Agranoff (2004, p. 95) states, “Recognize shared 
expertise-based authority.”  The members of the network will be better able to collaborate 
when they accept this kind of authority.  In addition to understanding authority within the 
network, participants must also understand the purpose of the network.  In lesson five 
Agranoff (2004, p. 95) argues to, “Stay within the decision bounds of your network.”  
One of the purposes of networked structures is to build capacity within participants, but 
that cannot occur if the network crosses its boundaries.   
Agranoff (2004, p. 96) states in lesson six to, “Accommodate and adjust while 
maintaining purpose.” This lesson is linked to flexibility, which is an advantage of 
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networks.  Flexibility allows the network to move quickly to solve emerging issues.  
Similarly, in lesson seven Agranoff (2004, p. 97) asserts, “Be as creative as possible.”  
The lesson seeks to encourage innovation, which is another advantage of networks.  
Networks seek to bring a wide range of members together to share information and build 
capacity.  In doing so they allow for more creative solutions because most traditional 
organizations are not able to aggregate the same amount and breadth of information.  
Lesson eight encourages network managers to, “Be patient and use interpersonal skills.” 
(Agranoff, 2004, p. 97)  In order for the network to succeed each member must buy into 
the purpose, process, and goals of the network.  This buy-in can be difficult though.  It 
may take time and work to achieve.   
Over the course of a project or problem-solving endeavor the context of the 
network may change.  Because of these changes it is important for the network to also 
change.  Agranoff (2004, p. 98) solution to allowing for these changes makes up lesson 
nine – “Recruit constantly.”  Constantly adding new members allows for new and/or 
better information to flow into the network continually.  Agranoff’s (2004, p. 98) final 
lesson argues that network managers should, “Emphasize incentives.” Members of 
networks must be reminded of the benefits of the network arrangement.  They must 
understand that the time and work necessary for a successful network will, in the end, be 
beneficial to their home agency and them as individuals.   
 Despite all of the research regarding the advantages and disadvantages of 
networks, there is still no definitive answer as to whether networks achieve better results 
than traditional, hierarchical organizations.  Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) argue that 
networked structures will produce better results in some situations but not all.  They set 
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forth a set to factors that can be used to determine when a networked structure is most 
appropriate.  They also compiled a list of characteristics that would best served by a 
traditional, hierarchical structure.  Table 1 outlines those characteristics.   
Table 1: Characteristics That Determine Organizational Structure 
Networked Structure Hierarchical Structure 
Flexibility Stability 
Differentiated response Uniform response 
Diverse skills Single professional skill 
Many potential private players available Government predominant provider 
Clear outcome or output goals Ambiguous outcome 
Skill gaps filled by the private sector Government has necessary experience 
Leveraging private assets is critical Outside capacity is not needed 
Partners have great reach Government experienced with citizens in 
this area 
Multiple services for the same customer Stand-alone service 
Third parties achieve goal cheaper than 
government 
In-house delivery is cheaper 
Rapidly changing technology Service is not affected by changing 
technology 
Multiple levels of government Single level of government 
Multiple agencies use similar functions Single agency uses similar functions 
Table 1 lists the characteristics that are best served by either a networked or hierarchical organizational 
structure (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004, p. 51). 
 
The argument between a networked structure and a hierarchical structure is 
similar to the argument between the command-and-control approach and the emergent 
human resources model (EHRM) that occurs in the field of emergency response.  EHRM 
shares some of the attributes of a networked structure including flexibility and diverse 
skills (Neal & Phillips, 1995).  The command-and-control approach shares characteristics 
such as a rigid bureaucratic arrangement with the hierarchical structure presented in 
Table 1 (Neal & Phillips, 1995).  Overall, Neal and Phillips (1995) argue that the EHRM 
is more appropriate than the command-and-control model because emergence is a key 
characteristic of responding to events.  Wise (2002, 2006) made a similar argument 
terrorism and homeland security.   
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When comparing the characteristics of emergency response, it becomes clear that 
a networked structure is more than appropriate.  The use of networks in emergency is not 
a new idea though.  Networks have been used or suggested for use in emergency response 
and for some time.   McEntire (2002) illustrates the use of networks to coordinate 
emergency response in his study of the March 28, 2000, Fort Worth, TX tornado.  He 
gathered observational data, information from newspapers and the Internet, and 
interviewed several key officials in the course of his research.  He concluded that because 
the response involved many public, private, and non-profit organizations, coordination 
was the key to a successful response.  More specifically, intra- and interorganizational 
coordination, as well as the coordination of several agent-generated demands, are the key 
to successful response (McEntire, 2002).   
 The emergency response in Fort Worth was the result of a network of 
organizations collaborating.  But the entire response network was not involved in every 
response activity.  Each activity was performed by a smaller subset – project network – of 
the larger emergency response network (Mandell, 1988).  These project networks were 
based on previous experience, technology, and available resources.  For example, a 
network of city and county emergency management staff, the EOC, the media, the 
National Weather Service, and Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES) 
personnel faced warning and evacuation.  The fire department, EOC, and dispatch center 
coordinated the medial response and incident management.  The fire department also 
called in the Texas Task Force Urban Search and Rescue Team to help with search and 
rescue operations.  The public information network was populated by the city Public 
Information Officer, the EOC, and the Media.  These are just a few examples of how 
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networks of public and private sector organizations were networked together to provide a 
well-coordinated response. 
 According to McEntire (2002), the response to the Fort Worth tornado was well 
coordinated for several reasons.  First, there was political support for emergency 
management.  The support of political leadership led to emergency management officials 
and the EOC having a legitimate claim to authority and control within the response 
network.  The response was also well coordinated because there was an emphasis on 
networking and cooperation (McEntire, 2002).  Key players and organizations were 
aware of other organizations and how they were to interact with those organizations 
during the response effort.  Prior disaster experience also enhanced coordination during 
the tornado response (McEntire, 2002).  Having the appropriate technology to respond to 
the tornado played a role in coordinating the response, as well.  Response organizations 
were able to utilize cell phones, trunk radios, and the Internet to relay information within 
organizations, between organizations, and to the public (McEntire, 2002).  It is important 
to remember that technology was only effective because the network and cooperative 
relationships were already in place.  The final factor that led to the well-coordinated 
response was the EOC (McEntire, 2002).  Fort Worth’s EOC was large enough to include 
the many response organizations.  It was also well staffed and equipped with the right 
technology to respond to the event.  McEntire (2002) notes that many of the officials 
interviewed felt the EOC and its staff were key to the coordination effort.  In other words, 
the EOC functioned like it should.   
In another study of the use of interorganizational networks in response, Gillespie 
and Murty (1994) researched poor linkage cracks in a post-disaster service delivery 
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network.  Linkage cracks occur when organizations are not sufficiently connected within 
the network.  When organizations within the network are not properly linked, the network 
will not be well coordinated (Gillespie & Murty, 1994).  A poor linkage crack can take 
two forms: Type A and Type B.  Type A poor linkage cracks occur when some 
organizations within the network have no interaction at all.  The organizations with no 
interaction are known as isolates and result in the most serious type of linkage cracks.  
When a Type A linkage crack occurs subpar coordination is almost certain (Gillespie & 
Murty, 1994).  Type B poor linkage cracks occur when an organization or several 
organizations are linked to the network through only indirect means.  Those organizations 
with only indirect ties to the network are known as peripherals.  When peripherals exist 
within a network, coordination will be inefficient (Gillespie & Murty, 1994).   
In order to measure the presence of these cracks in a response network, Gillespie 
and Murty (1994) studied a Midwestern urban region.  They used an earthquake vignette, 
or simulation, to study how 80 organizations interacted during a response.  Each 
organization completed a questionnaire about their interorganizational relationships and 
characteristics of their own organization.  The resulting analysis separated the 
organizations into nine structurally equivalent groups and six structurally unique 
organizations (Gillespie & Murty, 1994). Structurally unique organizations are those 
organizations that perform a unique role within the network.  They relate to other 
organizations in the network in ways that are very different than any other organization 
(Gillespie & Murty, 1994).  The same analysis discovered the presence of one group of 
isolates and two groups of peripherals within the network.   
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Using the results of their analysis Gillespie and Murty (1994) produced a map of 
the network studied that included the number of links between the groups. Based on the 
definitions of Type A and Type B poor linkage cracks given above both types of poor 
linkage cracks occur within the studied response network.  These poor linkage cracks 
would represent weaknesses in the network – activities or functions that would not be 
effectively managed in the aftermath of an event.  Because the response network 
researched by Gillespie and Murty (1994) was responding to a vignette and not an actual 
event, the coordination problems predicted did not come to fruition.  But because 
response is directly linked to preparedness, the knowledge of these possible cracks should 








After a review of the extant literature on both EOCs and networks, several key 
points should be highlighted.  First, an effective EOC is critical to an effective local 
response because it is a central location that facilitates coordination and communication.  
Second, the physical characteristics of an EOC can affect the operation of the EOC.  In 
order to be effective an EOC must be large enough to accommodate the local response 
network and also have the appropriate technology and resources to provide for the six 
general task areas described by Quarantelli (1972; 1978).  Third, the demands placed on 
local EOCs by emergency response require integrated interorganizational relationships 
between the private and public sector.  Fourth, a networked approach is an appropriate 
way to achieve this type of integrated interorganizational relationship.   
The use of networks in emergency management is not a new idea, but there is still 
the need for greater research about the range of relationships that exist within the larger 
emergency response network.  One such relationship is the relationship between 
municipalities and large, public research universities that are located within their 
jurisdiction.  The relationship between municipalities and public universities is unique 
because universities are not political jurisdictions.  In many states, universities are state
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agencies which means they are covered by a different set of statutes than political 
jurisdictions.  Despite these legal differences, the need for effective response is the same, 
so public universities must collaborate with other local jurisdictions to provide for an 
effective response.  The research presented here studies the relationship between a small 
municipality and the large public research university located within its jurisdiction.  
Specifically, it studies how the EOCs of each entity are evolving relationships for 
interaction in the event of multijurisdictional emergency.  It is hypothesized that the two 
entities will form an interorganizational network to provide a coordinated response.  The 
remainder of this chapter explains the process used to study the relationship including 
data collection and data analysis.   
Research Process 
A qualitative approach was chosen to research this relationship because it allows 
the researcher to describe and explain the behavior of the subjects (Spradley, 1980).  In 
the case of this study, a qualitative approach allows each official to explain in his or her 
own words how their EOC operates and how they perceive the state of 
interorganizational relations with the other EOC. Such an approach is particularly 
appropriate given the significant gaps in the existing literature.  In such instances, a 
qualitative approach allows the researcher to explore the research problem.  Usually, this 
type of research unfolds inductively.  In the present case, research literature informed the 
general approach, but the data analysis process allowed for themes to emerge inductively 
from the data 
The data collection method adopted for this study was interviews. Interviews 
allow participants to frame their responses within broader contexts that enrich and deepen 
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their explanation.  Interviews are also helpful when participants and processes cannot be 
directly observed (Cresswell, 2003). Using interviews also allows the researcher to keep 
subjects on topic more readily than other methods.  This research topic is especially well 
suited for interviews because time constraints would not allow the researcher to wait for 
the opportunity to observe the response to a multijurisdictional event.  The method also 
allows the officials interviewed to fully explain their procedures and perceptions of the 
interorganizational relationships, which could not be gleaned from observations or 
analyzing documents.   Despite the advantages of using interviews, there were also some 
possible limitations.  The first limitation is the indirect nature of interviews.  There is no 
way to confirm that the procedures and relationships described by the subjects are how 
the response would actually proceed.  There is also some question as to how the presence 
of the researcher affects the subject’s responses (Cresswell, 2003). 
Interview subjects were chosen using a non-probability sampling approach based 
primarily on snowball sampling techniques.  This sampling technique was selected 
because of the nature of the problem being studied.  Emergency management at the local 
level occurs through a network of organizations and individuals.  The organizational 
structure of the EOC is a smaller network formed from the members of the larger 
response network, so the use of a snowball technique is one way to study the network.  
The use of a snowball technique also ensures that those interviewed are actually part of 
the response network.  With a snowball technique, bias can be a concern because 
previous subjects could provide the researcher only those subjects that agree with them or 
could exclude some that are peripheral to the interorganizational network but important 
nonetheless.  The first two subjects were chosen because they were known to be 
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associated with one of the two EOCs.  Those two subjects then suggested additional 
subjects who could add to the research.  The collection of data began once the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved the research procedures.  The completed and 
approved IRB application is contained in Appendix A.   
 The interview guide used to collect data for the study was composed of two 
sections.  The first section of the guide was used to collect data about the two EOCs.  The 
questions were derived from a review of the extant literature on EOC design and 
operations.  The section’s purpose was to provide data about the structures and operations 
of the EOC.  The questions ranged from describing the physical arrangement of the 
operations room to naming the departments represented in their EOC to their activation 
procedures.  The officials also discussed the amount of training and number of exercises 
that included the use of the EOC.  Each official was also given an opportunity to describe 
the strengths and weaknesses of their EOC.   
The next section of the interview guide was concerned with the dimensions of 
interorganizational relationships as defined by Drabek (1987).  He argues that five 
dimensions of interorganizational relationships determine how successful an emergency 
manager is in integrating his/her agency into the broader response network.  The five 
dimensions are frequency of director contact, structural location of contact point, degree 
of formalization, number of joint programs, and amount of overlapping memberships 
(Drabek, 1987).  The assumption is that a successful emergency manager will create and 
nurture an integrated interorganizational response network based on these dimensions.  
This assumption is based on the extant literature concerning the need for 
interorganizational cooperation and coordination to effectively respond to all types and 
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sizes of events.  The assumption is also based on the existing literature regarding 
networks, network management, and the use of networks in emergency management.  
Questions in this section of the interview include how often do you meet with your 
counterpart at each of the EOCs; do you have any formal agreements with other EOCs 
and; do you conduct any joint programs with other EOCs?  One last subject covered in 
the final section of the interview was perceived interorganizational coordination, which 
provides a picture as to how each official views the relationship between the two entities.  
The questions used to examine this ask for respondents’ perceptions regarding EOC 
coordination in the event of a multijurisdictional response.  These questions are meant to 
provide insight into coordination between the two entities.  To view the interview guide 
see Appendix B.   
Interview Process 
With IRB approval and a completed interview guide, the interviews were 
scheduled.  In all, four interviews were conducted with officials from both the university 
and the municipality.  Two interviewees were conducted with university officials, one 
with a boundary spanner, and one with a city official.  The small number of subjects 
limits the generalizablity of the study, but along with other data described shortly and 
repeated contact, it provides enough information to describe the two EOC cases and their 
perceived interrelationships.  The officials interviewed each hold management roles in 
one or both of the EOCs.  Holding management positions within the EOC provides each 
respondent with invaluable information about the design and operations of the EOC.  
Each interview was conducted in the official’s office or the EOC, which provided a 
comfortable atmosphere for the subject (Gorden, 1992).  The interview process began 
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with an informed consent procedure to ensure the research subject understood his or her 
rights as a volunteer and also the possible risks of participating.  Each subject was also 
informed that the interview would be recorded using a digital recording device and that 
the interviewer would be taking notes throughout the interview.  Recording the 
interviews is advantageous for two reasons.  First, it allows the interviewer to focus on 
the interview rather than on taking notes.  It also allows the interviewer to have a 
complete record of the interview (Gorden, 1992).  The subject and researcher each 
received a signed copy of the consent form prior to any questions being asked.  The 
informed consent form is located in Appendix C.   
Once informed consent was obtained, the interview began with a series of 
questions regarding the official’s own EOC.  These questions were presented at the 
beginning of the interview because it allows the interviewer and subject to gain  rapport.  
This rapport will be helpful when the interviewer begins asking about the relationships 
between the two entities.  The rapport was built by acting professionally toward the 
subject and actively listening to their responses (Gorden, 1992).  The second portion of 
the interview included questions about the interorganizational relationship between the 
EOCs of the city and university.  The questions in both sections of the interview elicited 
answers of varying lengths and amounts of detail.  Those answers that needed more 
detailed were followed up by probe questions that were meant to provide that detail.  The 
interviews ranged in length from 30 minutes to almost 2 hours.  Overall, the interview 
subjects provided the information asked willingly and completely.  In addition to the 
information gained through the interview guide, the researcher also collected visual data 
and observed the arrangement of the EOC.       
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After completing each interview, the researcher reviewed the recordings and notes 
to ensure that all questions had been answered and to determine whether any follow-up 
contact would be needed.  Follow-up contact was made with each of the interview 
subjects.  One university official and one city official were contacted twice following the 
initial interview, which included another visit to each of the EOCs.  The remaining two 
interview subjects were only contacted once following the initial interview.  After 
completing the review of completeness, the interviews were transcribed by the 
interviewer.  The transcriptions were made from both the digital recordings and notes 
taken during the interview.  The interviews were not transcribed in total (Gorden, 1992, 
p. 176).  The relevant information and quotes were transcribed in order to focus the 
researcher’s attention on the key data in a manner suggested by Spradley (1980).  
Relevancy was based on consistency of interview response vis-à-vis the relevance of 
questions that emanated from a review of the literature on EOCs and networks.  The 
information in the interview transcriptions were then coded and analyzed as described 
next.  
Documentary Data 
In addition to the interview data, other documents were gathered to deepen and 
enrich the cases.  The use of visual data is increasingly being used in disaster research 
(Blinn-Pike, Phillips, and Reeves, 2006; Phillips, 1997).  The visual data collected 
includes photographs of the EOCs and observational sketches of the EOC complex.  The 
photos and sketches of the two EOCs more data regarding the structures located in the 
EOC, which will enable the researcher to provide a more complete description of the 
EOC and serve as a point of triangulation.   
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In addition to photos and sketches, the community’s multi-hazard plan was also 
collected.  The multi-hazard mitigation plan includes information regarding the 
relationship between the city and university that will further inform the analysis of the 
degree of integration in the city-university EOC network. In the present case, the 
mitigation plan served as an important collaborative experience that occurred just prior to 
the development of the university EOC.  As such, the planning process helped to 
establish and/or firm up interorganizational relationships.   Webb (et al. 2000) that 
documents should be viewed with caution because of potential problems associated with 
selective deposit or selective retrieval which means that the document could be 
influenced or biased by those that created it. In most cases, selective deposit and retrieval 
mean that portions of a document could be lost.  In this case, the mitigation plan required 
an open, public-involved process that operated through consensus-building. The 
document was available to the public and confirmed by local city officials and the 
Federal Emergency Management Administration regional office (FEMA). Portions of the 
university portion of the mitigation plan are available on a university website 
(http://disaster.okstate.edu/Multi-Hazard%20Mitigation%20Plan.html, accessed July 1, 
2009) and demonstrate the existence of some degree of interorganizational relationships. 
In addition to analyzing photos, sketches, and the mitigation plan, observational 
data were also collected during tours of each of the EOCs.  The researcher visited each 
EOC multiple times; in addition, the researcher was a student intern in the city EOC in 
the summer of 2007.  The first visit was for the purpose of the interview.  The second 
visit included a tour of the EOC that enabled the researcher to sketch and observe the 
EOC.  The observational data was collected through notes based on Spradley’s (1980) 
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matrix that included the consideration of spaces, their use and the relationships that occur 
within those spatial areas.  In each tour an EOC official guided the researcher around 
their EOC complexes describing each room’s purpose and allowing the researcher to 
sketch the area.  During the tours, notes were taken about both the official’s descriptions 
of the rooms and also the researchers’ own observations of the rooms.  The notes 
regarding the official’s descriptions of the spatial usage were taken in the form of a 
condensed account, meaning important phrases, words, and sentences were written down.  
After the tour a more detailed expanded account was constructed using the condensed 
account and the observations of the researcher.  These notes were analyzed with the 
interview subject’s responses to the interview guide to provide a description of the two 
EOCs.   
Data Analysis 
The first section of the interview guide and observational data was used to 
provide a picture of each EOC.  The information provided during each interview along 
with observations of the EOC and documentary data were compiled and then translated 
into a narrative description of the design and operations of each EOC.   The description 
of each EOC was then compared to the literature on EOCs to determine if they include 
structures that will support the six general task areas of EOCs described by Quarantelli 
(1972; 1978).  If the EOC includes these structures, it would suggest that the EOC would 
be effective during response.  The second section of the interview guide underwent two 
forms of analysis.  The first form of analysis compared the statements of each official 
about their interorganizational relationship to the results of Drabek (1987).  The purpose 
of this comparison is to determine whether the interorganizational network formed by the 
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two EOCs is integrated.  The comparison not perfect though.  The small sample size in 
this study limits the generalizabilty, but the comparison should provide a sense of if an 
integrated network exists.  The use of multiple data sources also strengthens the findings.  
If the findings suggest that an integrated interorganizational relationship exists, it would 
suggest that the two EOCs would be well coordinated in the event of a multijurisdictional 
event.  The second form of analysis is based in grounded theory.  Grounded theory is 
characterized by the researcher as deriving a general explanation that is grounded in the 
views of participants in a study (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  To do so, the research 
conducts an initial coding of the data to identify themes.  Using a constant comparative 
approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) the researcher then compares similarly coded data to 
insure the data should remain in their initial code.  By doing so, it is possible to glean 
themes from the data that respondents offer per the interview questions.    The researcher 
“listens to the data” for such themes to emerge by repeatedly reading the same transcripts 
and listening to the audio interviews.  This approach allows for the research to be assured 
that themes are grounded in the data.  Overall, the research uncovered five major themes 
or patterns that appeared in the officials’ responses to the interview guide.  The themes 
seem to lead to five factors or techniques that are used to build and maintain the 
integrated interorganizational network that exists between the two EOCs studied. 
To analyze the visual data, the researcher conducted an inventory of the items and 
spaces within the photographs (Pike, Phillips, Reeves, 2007). By comparing the inventory 
with the narrative accounts provided in the interviews, it is possible to triangulate 
respondent perspectives with tangible, physical locations.  As noted later in the findings, 
this comparison allowed for the researcher to compare EOC functions and designs and to 
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document that interorganizational relationships were emergent in nature. Observational 
data were analyzed using Spradley’s (1980) matrix to look at the intersections between 
physical elements and human agency, for example, how respondents described the 
physical use of the spaces.  These observations served as a further source of triangulation.  
Credibility and Trustworthiness of the Data 
Qualitative researchers examine the credibility and trustworthiness of their data 
through multiple means (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).  For this project, several strategies 
were used.  The first and most important was triangulation.  For a qualitative study, 
triangulation means that the same topic is examined using multiple data sources.  
Interviews, documents, and observation strategies were employed to look at EOC design, 
structure, and interorganizational relationships.  Each provided a means for double-
checking the finding that emerged from the interview data.  For example, if a respondent 
indicated that they had integrated the other EOC into theirs in order to enhance 
communications, examination of maps and photos allowed for independent confirmation.  
In addition to triangulation, peer debriefing and members’ validity checks were used to 
examine credibility and trustworthiness.  In peer debriefing the researcher discusses their 
research methods with an impartial third party.  In this case, the researcher discussed the 
research methods and data with their faculty thesis advisor.  The researcher also 
employed member validity checks to examine credibility and trustworthiness.  The 
interview subject reviews and comments on the interview transcriptions characterize 
member validity checks.  The respondents were asked to check for accuracy as well as 







Chapter IV presents the findings of the research described in the previous chapter.  The 
first two sections describe each EOC studied.  The next section describes the findings as 
to whether the two EOCs are creating an integrated interorganizational network.  The 
final section of this chapter presents the five factors that built and maintain the 
relationship between the two EOCs.   
University EOC 
 The current university EOC had been in existence for about six months prior to 
the interview.  Before its construction, a police conference room served as the EOC when 
necessary.  The new EOC consists of an operations room that contains a conference/EOC 
table in the center of the room and several workstations on the perimeter of the room.  
The EOC also includes medium and small offices that serve as meeting rooms.  There is 
also a room to be used for training, but it was not complete at the time of the interview.  
The conference table includes phones and laptop connectivity at each station.  The center 
portion of the EOC table contains cubbyholes for the phones and laptops, which enable 
the table to transform into a conference table.  See Figure 1 for a visual of the operations 
room.  The positions at the conference table and the workstations are not assigned to 
specific university or community entities.  There would be a space saved for the city if 
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they requested a position.  A university official explained that the EOC is so new, “there 
are no designated spots but there aren’t designated spots for much of anything right now 
because the EOC is still being developed.”  The EOC has its own heating and air units, 
stand-by emergency power, and a fire detection system in place.  The facility is also 
located below ground.  The university EOC has no designated back-up EOC, but officials 
state they could share resources with the city or possibly use their football stadium’s 
operations center. 
Figure 1: University Operations Room 
 
Figure 1 is a view of the university EOC researched.  The picture was provided by one of the university 
officials interviewed and reproduced here with their permission. 
 
Figure 2: University Executive Room 
 
Figure 2 is a view of the executive meeting room in the university EOC.  The picture was provided by one 
of the university officials interviewed and reproduced here with their permission.  
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Figure 3: University Training Room 
 
Figure 3 is a view of the training room in the university EOC. The picture was provided by one of the 
university officials interviewed and reproduced here with their permission. 
 
The university has trained and exercised their emergency response network in the 
past, but the new EOC has not been tested or exercised yet because of its newness.  The 
officials interviewed recognize that more advanced training is needed.  In fact one 
university official stated, “training is constant” in emergency management.  But because 
almost all emergency response personnel at the university are involved in emergency 
management only part time – which is typical especially in smaller jurisdictions and 
organizations – finding time for training and exercises can be difficult.  One official also 
believes that because emergency management has not been a priority in the past that 
training and exercises have suffered.  The same official related a story that illustrates this 
point.  In addition to training, the university has employed tabletop and functional 
exercises in the past.  They are also planning to conduct more training and exercise 
programs once the EOC is completed.   
 The university’s activation procedures are being redefined in a new emergency 
operations plan (EOP).  At the time of the interviews the procedure was based on the 
request for resources or policy decisions from the incident commanders in the field.  The 
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EOC group may also be called together if there is the possibility of an event that would 
produce the need for additional resources or policy decisions.  The officials interviewed 
also recognized that each event is different; therefore the need to activate the EOC would 
be based on different factors.  The EOP will include a general protocol, but it will not 
contain a set of detailed rules for activation. 
 Each official was given the opportunity to describe the strengths and weaknesses 
of their EOC.  One university official described the use of technology, such as monitors, 
as a highlight of the newly renovated EOC.  Another stated that it was too early to really 
understand the strengths of the EOC because it was untested.  That same official did see 
some weak spots though.  The official stated, “we have a mass notification system in 
place, but we are looking at ways to improve the system.  We are looking at whether the 
system works.”  The same official would like to improve the public information function 
of the university EOC.   Both university officials interview emphasized that the EOC is a 
work in progress.  There is still a list of items on the EOC’s to-do list.  Once the EOC is 
complete and tested or exercised, officials assume that the strengths and weaknesses will 
become more apparent. 
 Based on the literature regarding EOCs, the university EOC’s design should 
support the needs of the university during emergency response.  While the EOC has not 
been tested yet, it contains or will contain the technology and structures necessary to 
perform the six general task areas of EOCs described by Quarantelli (1972, 1978).  The 
university has also taken measures to ensure that the EOC will continue to be viable 
during and after the impact of an event by providing the center with its own heating and 
air units, back-up power, fire resistant wall material, and a fire detection system.  The 
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EOC is not perfect though.  Some of the problems include the lack of a back-up EOC that 
is separate from the city’s EOC.  The importance of a back-up EOC is emphasized in the 
work of Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003b).     
Municipal EOC 
 The city has had a formal EOC since the mid-1970s, but the EOC has evolved 
since then.  The first EOC was a conference room adjacent to the emergency manager’s 
office.  In the late 1970s, the EOC evolved into an operations room with cubicles for 
different city departments.  In this version of the EOC there was a conference table at 
which the city manager sat at the head of the table.  Each department had a spot at the 
conference table and then a cubicle that was directly behind their spot.  The 
representatives in the EOC were from police, fire, public works, electric, water, parks and 
recreation, and the city attorney.  In 2002 the city moved its EOC to a new building 
where the current EOC resides.   
The current version of the EOC is larger than the previous versions.  The EOC 
complex includes a large operations room with several smaller support areas located in 
different rooms.  There is a communications room, an area for the public information 
officer (PIO), and a radar room.  Each department has a cubicle in the operations room.  
The placement of the cubicles is based on their activity level.  The departments that 
regularly respond to events are closer to the decision makers in the front of the operations 
room than those organizations that only respond to a few types of events.  The 
departments that respond routinely include fire, police, public works, parks and 
recreation, electric, water and department of environmental quality.  Those that only 
respond in certain types of events include the Red Cross, Salvation Army, sheriff, 
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highway patrol, and the state emergency management agency.  Overall, the general 
arrangement resembles the classroom layout described by Neal (2003).  The city EOC 
also includes a liaison from the university.  The new EOC complex is also self-
sustainable for up to two weeks.   
Figure 4: City EOC Operations Room 
 
Figure 4 is a view from the back of the city EOC looking toward where the decision makers would set.  
The picture is reproduced here with the permission of the city official interviewed. 
 
Figure 5: City EOC Operations Room 
 
Figure 5 is a view from the front of the city EOC, where decision makers would set, looking toward agency 









Figure 6: City EOC Radar Room 
 
Figure 6 is one view of the city radar room. The picture is reproduced here with the permission of the city 
official interviewed. 
 
The city is currently working on a back-up EOC.  The back-up EOC will include 
many of the same features as the EOC.  A city official stated it would be the same except 
for the niceties of the EOC.  It will have fewer phone lines and folding tables and chairs.  
The city also has a mobile EOC trailer that could be used.  If necessary a city official 
stated, “We could share resources with the university.”  The city uses small incidents to 
train EOC staff.  A city official stated that the turnover of staff within city departments 
causes difficulties in terms of training. 
Figure 7: City Mobile Units 
 
Figure 7 shows the different mobile units utilized by the municipality study.  The picture is reproduced here 
with the permission of the city official interviewed. 
 
The city utilizes functional exercises for non-EOC personnel.  The city utilizes a 
situational protocol for activating their EOC, stating that the events determine the level of 
activation.  During normal working hours the city EOC is at a level one activation, which 
means they are monitoring and in communication with staff.  An event such as an ice 
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storm that would include electric, water, police, and fire personnel characterizes level two 
activation.  A level three activation includes more personnel but no declared state of 
emergency.  The highest level of activation – level four – would represent a declared state 
of emergency in which outside assistance is needed.  The activation procedures employed 
by the city are consistent with activation levels at many EOCs. 
The city official interviewed stated that the most important strength of the city 
EOC is that “it works”.  In other words, the EOC has been effective in responding to 
events in the past.  The official also touted the information technology and 
communications capabilities of the EOC, which includes both internal and external 
wireless capabilities and redundancy.  Another strength mentioned was in-house mapping 
of the community, including residential and commercial areas.  The city EOC has saved 
all the maps and diagrams of the city on an internal network, which will allow for better 
access during EOC activity.  When asked what they would change about the current EOC 
the city official stated that they would like to find more useable space in the current 
operations room.  They also stated that they once had an idea about a different layout but 
now thinks it would not be more efficient than the current arrangement.  They also stated 
that a better phone system would be beneficial.  
Based on the literature on EOCs, the municipal EOC described includes structures 
necessary to meet the six general tasks of an EOC described by Quarantelli (1972; 1978).  
The EOC is a large complex with room for personnel from the different organizations 
within the community’s emergency response network.  The EOC also includes elements 
of resiliency such as redundancy, dedicated utilities, and back-up power.  The city is in 
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the process of building a back-up EOC and also owns a mobile EOC, which further help 
to ensure effective response.   
Analysis of the Five Dimensions of Interorganizational Relationships 
Now that the two EOCs have been found to meet the six general task areas 
described by Quarantelli (1972, 1978), it must be determined whether a relationship 
exists between the two EOCs.  And, if a relationship does exist, how integrated is the 
relationship.  Drabek (1987) argues that the effectiveness of local emergency managers 
depends on how integrated their organizations are in the emergency management network 
that exists in their area.  In order to determine the degree of integration, Drabek (1987) 
used five dimensions of interorganizational relationships.  The analysis that follows is 
based on the assumption that a successful emergency manager will manage a successful 
EOC.  By comparing the interview responses to the results of Drabek (1987) one can get 
a sense of the interorganizational network that exists between the university and the city 
EOCs.  The first dimension studied by Drabek (1987) was the frequency of director 
contact.  That studied concluded that successful emergency managers were in frequent 
contact with their counterparts (Drabek, 1987, p. 113).  Frequent contact can be defined 
as meeting once per week to several times per week.  The results of the current research 
found a similar pattern between the city and university EOC officials.  Each of the 
officials stated they were in contact with their EOC counterparts at least once a week.  
One university official stated, “we [group of city and university emergency management 
officials] have lunch three times a week sometimes.”  A city official concurred 
independently that they “were in contact either by phone or in person several times a 
week.”    
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 The second dimension studied can be described as the structural location of 
contact point.  Drabek (1987) found that successful emergency managers cultivate 
contacts at higher levels within other agencies.  In other words their counterparts have a 
higher rank than they do.  The research presented here differs from these results slightly.  
The officials interviewed responded that their counterparts at the other EOC are of about 
equal rank.  A city official stated, “We are all managers,” which accounts for these 
results.  It is important to note that while their direct counterpart is of equal rank, each 
official interviewed also comes into contact with higher officials in the course of their 
work in the EOC.  A university official stated, “I also have contacts at all levels that are 
outside of the city.”  In the interview guide the question was specific to the city-
university EOC relationship, which could explain the difference.  
 The degree of formalization is a third dimension of interorganizational 
relationships.  Drabek (1987) found that most successful emergency mangers used formal 
agreements to form and manage their interorganizational network.  This cannot be said 
for the respondents in the research described here.  The officials interviewed all stated 
that no formal agreements existed between the university and city at the time of the 
interviews.  However, they also stated they were working toward formalizing verbal 
agreements.  A university official stated, “We are working on making agreements more 
formal especially with regards to how to respond, plan and mitigate disasters.”  
Specifically, the official are working to convert verbal agreements from the past into 
mutual aid agreements.  A city official stated the formalization process is due to “the 
university being treated differently than the city under the state’s intrastate emergency 
management compact.”  Another university official added another reason for formalizing 
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the relationship: “We are making sure we meet the FEMA requirements for 
reimbursement.”  According to Drabek (1987), the process of formalization should make 
the city-university response network more integrated. 
 The number of joint programs is the fourth dimension of interorganizational 
relationships.  According to Drabek’s (1987) results one half of successful directors 
reported 3 or more joint programs with other agencies in their interorganizational 
network.  The officials interviewed in this study reported three to four joint programs 
between the two EOCs.  The types of programs included mass notification, training, 
exercises, and a community mitigation plan.  A university official stated, “All training is 
done together.”  A city official stated, “We share warning sirens.  The city is responsible 
for activating them, but the university has the ability to, if necessary.”  In addition to 
sharing mass notification and training, another university official stated, “We have 
conducted joint exercises in the past.  And, we plan to do more in the future when the 
EOC is complete.”  Three of the four officials also included the community mitigation 
plan as a joint program.   A university official and a city official also mentioned shared 
weather spotters.  The results are similar to those of Drabek (1987), which suggests an 
integrated network.  
 The final dimension of interorganizational relationships is the amount of 
overlapping memberships.  Informal relationships between members of the network are 
important because they help solidify the network (Drabek et al., 1981).  In the results of 
his study Drabek (1987) found that about one half of successful emergency directors had 
some kind of additional contact with their counterparts outside of the response network.  
All of the officials interviewed indicated they had contact with their counterparts outside 
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of the EOC.  A university official stated that they interact monthly at the Local 
Emergency Planning Commission meetings.  Another university official indicated, 
“There is a lot of overlapping membership on outside projects and committees such as the 
community mitigation plan.”  A city official stated, “We [city and university emergency 
management officials] meet for lunch every Friday.”   
 Overall, the university-city EOC network includes or will include all of the 
dimensions of an integrated interorganizational network as outlined by Drabek (1987), 
which suggests that the network will encourage a well coordinated response in a 
multijurisdictional response.  Sorensen (1985) outlines the importance of an integrated 
interorganizational network.  The degree of formalization is the one dimension that the 
relationship is lacking, but both entities are working to increase the degree of 
formalization.  The structural location of contacts is one area that doesn’t align exactly 
with Drabek’s (1987) results, but this could be attributed to the wording of the question.  
The question was worded using the word counterpart, which could be interpreted in 
different ways other than the intended meaning.  Based on the interviewees’ responses in 
other questions it is clear that they are in contact with members at all levels of the other 
entity, whether it be the university or the city. 
Conditions for Building and Maintaining the Interorganizational Relationship 
 In the previous sections of this chapter the data showed that the city and 
university EOCs formed an integrated interorganizational network.  With that 
information the next step is to understand how the network was built and maintained.  
Using grounded theory, five important factors emerged to explain how the network 
formed and is maintained.   The first theme is making emergency management a priority 
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in the community.  In order to build an effective interorganizational network there must 
be support from the upper level management in the member organizations (Agranoff, 
2004).  The same goes for building a network between two EOCs. As discussed 
previously the emergency management program and EOC at the university are relatively 
new, but the idea of having a program at the university is not a new idea.  According to 
the officials interviewed, there has “been some support for building a program for years, 
but it took a “very strong supporter within the university’s administration” to make the 
program a reality.  The support within the university coupled with the long-standing 
emergency management program and EOC at the city laid the groundwork for the 
integrated interorganizational network that formed between the two entities.  But 
groundwork is not enough to support the network.  There are still issues within the 
university in making emergency management a priority.  One university official said the 
lack of priority is due to, “emergency management being a part-time job for most 
people.”  The same official also stated that, “it will be valued when something happens,” 
which the official recognized as “too late.”  Just as the EOC is “a work in progress,” the 
process of making emergency management a priority is also a work in progress. 
 A second theme that emerged was the importance of prior relationships to the 
university-city network.   Drabek (1981; 1987) has emphasized the importance of 
previous relationships and informal ties for two decades.  The study of the city-university 
network finds similar results, in that all of the officials included previous relationships as 
one reason they felt the two entities would be well coordinated in the event of 
multijurisdictional event.  A university official stated that the two entities would be 
coordinated “because we know each other.”  A city official states that the two will be 
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coordinated “because we have worked together in the past” at university athletic events 
and other community wide events.  Another university official stated that previous 
relationships are important because “there are things that can be handled better one-on-
one.”  These responses indicate that the two entities have built trust – or social capital – 
through previous relationships that binds the network together.   
The third major theme was the importance of overlapping membership in the city-
university network.  Each EOC can and will accommodate a liaison from the other during 
an event.  This liaison acts to connect the two EOCs when they are activated, but a liaison 
is not the only way the two EOCs are connected.  The EOCs are also connected by the 
relationships built between EOC staff that are members of outside organizations or serve 
on other projects together outside of EOC activities.  One university official stated that 
the university and city “worked for months and months on a community wide mitigation 
plan” together.  Another university stated, “Many of us [city and university EOC staffers] 
serve on the LEPC together.”  In addition to these projects, one official stated, 
“everything is trained together.”  This includes FEMA training and CERT training.  In 
addition to joint training, the emergency management programs share weather spotters 
and warning sirens. The relationships formed during these endeavors build capacity 
within the network.  In other words, these overlapping memberships, joint programs, and 
shared training are how previous relationships are built. 
The use of WebEOC, a type of VEOC, also emerged as a theme in the interview 
responses.  According to the officials interviewed the state emergency management office 
bought WebEOC for use in all the EOCs in the state.  The state hopes the program will 
increase the flow of information and coordination between jurisdictions.  The program 
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has not yet been implemented in the two EOCs but will eventually have an effect on the 
relationship between the two entities because it represents another way to link the two 
entities.  A university official interviewed stated that a major benefit of the software is 
that the state “knows exactly what we are doing in the event they need to help us.”  The 
same official’s general view of the program is “that is has a lot of benefit to it.”  A city 
official had a decidedly negative view of the program though.  They stated, “Computers 
don’t make things easier; they make things more difficult. You can run an EOC with a 
pad of paper and four people.  If you add a computer, you add two more people.  If you 
interconnect through the web, you add more.  You don’t get any more work done.  It 
might even slow you down.”  The differing views on WebEOC will affect the 
implementation of the program in the city-university network because the system will not 
work if only one entity utilizes it.     
 The final major theme that was found throughout the data was the formalization 
of the relationship between the city and the university.  Formalizing the relationship had 
not been necessary until recently. These agreements are now necessary because the 
state’s intrastate emergency management only pertains to political jurisdictions, not 
universities.  One university official explained that, “the university is considered a state 
agency; therefore, legally the university’s contact for emergency resources is the state 
emergency management agency.  But, realistically, you have to have agreements within 
the local area.”  Because of these circumstances the two entities must formalize their 
relationship.  A city official stated that one of the major projects of both entities is “to 
formalize verbal agreements from the past.”  Once the new agreements are finalized they 
will be located in the EOPs of each entity.  A university official stated “making sure they 
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meet the FEMA requirements for reimbursement” was another reason for formalizing the 
relationship between the city and university.  The official further stated that “ if the city 
helps the university and the university files with FEMA for reimbursement under public 
assistance.  Unless there is a written memorandum of understanding or agreement with 
the city they are not eligible for reimbursement.”  When stated that way formalizing the 
relationship between the two entities becomes even more necessary.   
Overall Findings 
 The research presented here sought to discover how two EOCs with adjacent and 
overlapping jurisdictions interacted during a multijurisdictional event.  It was 
hypothesized that the two EOCs would form an interorganizational network to provide 
for a coordinated response.  The research process was designed to provide information 
that would determine if the two EOCs included structures that would meet the six 
functions of EOCs and if the two entities formed an integrated interorganizational 
network.  Overall the research found that the two EOCs did include structures or 
operations that would meet the six general task areas of an EOC, which suggests that the 
EOCs would be effective during an event.  The research also found that the two EOCs 
had formed an integrated interorganizational network, which would suggest that the two 
EOCs would provide a well-coordinated response during a multijurisdictional event.  In 
addition, the information was analyzed using grounded theory.  From this analysis 
emerged five themes that seem to build and maintain the integrated interorganizational 
network between the city and university.  The five factors are making emergency 
management a priority, the importance of previous relationships, the importance of 







The final chapter of this paper presents a summary of the previous chapters as well as the 
implications of the research and suggestions for future research. 
Overview 
The importance of the response period cannot be overstated.  In order to effectively 
recover from an event, a community must first effectively respond to that event.  
Response activities can vary based on the type and scale of the event, but there are some 
activities that must always take place.  These are known as response-generated demands 
and include communications, maintaining situational awareness, mobilizing and utilizing 
resources, control and authority, and coordination (Dynes et al., 1981).  In order to 
effectively respond to an event a community’s response network must meet these 
demands.  The effectiveness of response is also dependent on the interorganizational 
relationships that exist between the organizations and governments that are involved in 
response activities.  According to Sorensen et al. (1985) there are four main factors that 
determine the effectiveness of interorganizational response: domain consensus and role 
specification, integration, communication, and autonomy maintenance.  Overall, how a 
community coordinates the many organizations that are active in response determines the 
effectiveness of response. 
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With that said, the question becomes how to improve interorganizational 
relationships for the purpose of more effective response.  Drabek (1985) argues there are 
six strategies to improve interorganizational coordination.  These strategies include 
viewing community disaster planning as a process, improving warning systems, creating 
an effective EOC, conducting community disaster exercises, understanding multiagency 
decision styles, and knowing the response will be a multiagency activity.  This paper 
focuses on how EOCs can improve interorganizational coordination during response.  
The EOC is important to coordination because it serves as a central location for 
communications, resource management, and policymaking (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 
2003b).  According to Quarantelli (1972, 1978) the functions of an EOC can be separated 
into six general areas: coordination, policymaking, operations, information gathering, 
dispersal of public information, and hosting visitors.  In order to be an effective EOC, it 
must be designed and operated with these six general functions in mind.  The presence of 
structures to accomplish these tasks does not ensure effective response though.  The 
various response organizations must work collaboratively and cooperatively within the 
EOC to ensure effective response.  EOCs must also collaborate and cooperate with other 
EOCs because disasters rarely affect only one jurisdiction.  
 One way to foster this kind of collaboration and cooperation is a networked 
organizational structure not only within the EOC but also between EOCs.  Agranoff 
(2004, p. 63) defines a network as, “networks of public organizations, including both 
formal and informal structures, composed of representatives from governmental and 
nongovernmental agencies working interdependently to exchange information and/or 
jointly formulate and implement policies and programs that are usually designed for 
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action through their respective organizations.”  This definition describes how the 
organizations active in response work together in the EOC to coordinate an effective 
response.  But the presence of a networked structure is not enough to ensure an effective 
collaborative response.  Each member of the network must understand that the network 
must be nurtured and managed.  
 The original research presented in this paper sought to discover how two EOCs 
with adjacent and overlapping jurisdictions would interact during a multijurisdictional 
event.  It was hypothesized that the two EOCs would form an interorganizational network 
to provide for a coordinated response in a multijurisdictional event.  In order to study this 
issue a two-part interview guide was utilized during four interviews with city and 
university officials.  The responses of the officials along with observational data were 
then analyzed.  The analysis took three forms.  The first form of analysis sought to 
determine if the two EOCs studied could be considered effective.  Effectiveness was 
based whether the EOCs included structures to meet the six general task areas of EOCs, 
as described by Quarantelli (1972, 1978).  The second form of analysis sought to 
determine if the two EOCs had formed an integrated interorganizational network.  This 
determination was based on the five dimensions of interorganizational relationships 
described by Drabek (1987).  The final form of analysis employed grounded theory, 
which elicits theory from the view of the interview subjects (Cresswell, 2003). 
 The findings of the analysis suggest that the two EOCs do include the structures 
necessary to meet the general task areas of EOCs.  The findings also show that the two 
EOCs have formed an integrated interorganizational network.  These finding suggest that 
the two EOCs will provide a well-coordinate response in the event of a 
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multijurisdictional response.  From the analysis based on grounded theory emerged five 
themes that seem to be factors in building and nurturing the integrated interorganizational 
network between the city and university EOCs.  Those themes include making 
emergency management a priority, the importance of previous relationships, the 
importance of overlapping memberships, the use of WebEOC, and formalizing their 
relationship. In general, the research findings support the hypothesis that the two EOCs 
would form an integrated interorganizational network to provide for a coordinated 
response during a multijurisdictional event.  
Implications 
Despite the fact that each community is unique, the research presented here has 
implications for not only city-university response networks but also the many other types 
of response networks that exist.  First, the research upholds the idea that emergency 
management must be made a priority in order to provide effective response.  Using 
terminology from the network literature, there must be promoters in the upper echelons of 
each organization (Agranoff, 2004).  Another implication for response networks is the 
importance of prior relationships and boundary spanners.  The research on response has 
indicated that prior relationships and overlapping memberships help increase the 
effectiveness of response (Drabek, 1987; Drabek et al., 1981; Sorensen et al., 1985).  This 
indicates that other networks should work to build relationships between EOC personnel 
prior to an event.  There are many ways to build relationships between members of the 
network.  In the case of emergency response, the activities could include conducting joint 
training, community disaster exercises, and programming.  Prior relationships and 
boundary spanners help increase social capital/trust between members of the network.  
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The increase in trust leads to more collaboration and cooperation in the network 
(Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Kamensky et al., 2004; Lipnack & Stamps, 1994).   
This research also highlights the importance of mutual aid.  Mutual aid is 
important to city-university networks because the legal issues between the two entities.  
In the community studied, the state’s intrastate emergency management compact only 
pertained to political jurisdictions not universities that are considered state agencies.  
Because of these legal differences mutual aid agreements were necessary between the 
city and university.  While not all city-university relationships are the same, it is 
important for cities and universities to understand the legal issues that may arise prior to 
an event occurring.  If these legal issues are not understood, there could be serious 
consequences for not only response activities but also for reimbursement and recovery 
activities.   
A final implication that can be gleaned from the results of this study regards the 
use of VEOCs such as WebEOC.  Technology can provide ways to improve the operation 
of EOCs but technology is not a panacea.  The technology can only aid the response 
network in its activities (Wenger et al., 1986).  In order for these aids to work the 
relationships must be in place first.  So communities should not install technological 
solutions for coordination problems unless they also seek solutions that will connect 
members of the network.    
Suggestions for Future Research  
The use of networks in emergency management has been studied previously (for 
examples see Gillespie & Murty, 1994; Kiefer & Montjoy, 2006; McEntire, 2002; Waugh 
Jr., 2007b), but there is still more research to be done.  One area of research could be the 
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EOC as a network.  In other words, what are the human factors that affect how the EOC 
operates?  Similarly, how does the design of an EOC affect response operations?  In other 
words, are there structural changes that can be made within the EOC that will increase the 
effectiveness of response?  In general, we know that the EOC is a communications and 
coordination hub during emergency response.  We also know what functions should be 
accomplished within the EOC, but there is still much research to be done on how to 
increase the effectiveness of EOC operations.  This type of research is important not only 
for policy but also for practice.  If we understand the physical structures and 
organizational structures within the EOC that lead to more effective response, a set of 
best practices or policy guidance can be formed.  State and local officials could then use 
these documents to evaluate and improve the capacity of their own EOCs to respond to 
events. 
The direction of future research should include studies regarding VEOCs.  How 
VEOCs either aid or hinder EOC operations?  VEOCs have disadvantages that must be 
overcome for them to be effective, so there must be research on how to overcome those 
disadvantages.  There should also be research devoted to how VEOCs are best 
implemented in EOCs.  The use of VEOCs is a new concept, so there is a great need for 
more descriptive and systematic research on their use.  The information is necessary in 
order for decision makers to make good decisions regarding their use.  The cost of the 
software and the time necessary for implementation require good decisions regarding 
their use because local governments cannot take chances with monetary and human 
resources.  This is especially true under current economic circumstances.   
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In addition to studies of VEOCs, there should also be research about the general 
effectiveness of networked structures in emergency management.  There is no clear 
picture as to whether networked structures produce better results than hierarchical 
structures.  The circumstances that lend themselves well to networked structures are 
described above, but whether those structures are more effective than a hierarchical 
structure is not known.  It is important for both policy makers and practitioners to have 
this kind of information before they commit to one organizational structure over another 
because it would require considerable effort and resources to reverse such decisions.  It is 
also possible that choosing the wrong organizational structure could lead to ineffective 
response.  Ineffective response can have serious and deadly consequences.       
These ideas only represent a few of the possible avenues of future research on the 
use of networks in emergency management.  The key thing to take away from this is not a 
specific idea for research but that there is a need for more systematic study of the use of 
networks in emergency management.  The scope of this study is limited to only one 
network across one community, but there are an almost infinite number of networks in 
the U.S. emergency management system.  Future research should focus on mapping and 
understanding this vast array of networks.  It should also include the similarities of these 
networks and information of what makes certain networks effective and others 
ineffective.  Information about the response network in the U.S. is important because it 
could lead to policy learning within the system. In other words, it can be used to inform 
better broad policy decisions at the federal level.  It can also provide state and local 
governments and response organizations with best practices about how to use networks in 
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their community.   Overall, there is much still to know about the emergency management 
system in the U.S.
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Appendix A: IRB Application 
1. Describe the purpose and the research problem in the proposed study. 
      The purpose of the study is to discover the extent to which local emergency managers use collaboration and networks 
in multi-jurisdictional mass emergency and disaster events. 
 
2. (a) Describe the subjects of this study:   
 
1) Describe the sampling population:  The population will be local emergency managers who are acting in 
the course of their professional duties.  The initial participants were selected because of their geographic 
proximity to the investigators. 
2) Describe the subject selection methodology (i.e. random, snowball, etc):  The first two subjects were 
selected based on convenience.  The remaining subjects will be selected using the snowball technique 
because the research centers around the use of networks. 
3) Describe the procedures to be used to recruit subjects.  Include copies of scripts, flyers, 
advertisements, posters or letters to be used: A letter of request will be sent to the first two subjects.  
Once the other subjects are identified they will be sent a letter of request. 
4) Number of subjects expected to participate:  There will be no more than ten participants 
5) How long will the subjects be involved:  Each subject will be involved in the study for at least one 
interview with the possibility of follow up discussions.  The total time should be no longer than two hours. 
6) Describe the calendar time frame for gathering the data using human subjects:  The research will 
take no more than one year to complete gathering data. 
7) Describe any follow-up procedures planned:  Follow up discussion might be necessary for clarification 
and confirmation purposes. 
  
(b) Are any of the subjects under 18 years of age?  Yes   No 
 If Yes, you must comply with special regulations for using children as subjects.  Please refer to IRB Guide.   
 
3. Provide a detailed description of any methods, procedures, interventions, or manipulations of human 
subjects or their environments and/or a detailed description of any existing datasets to be accessed for 
information.  Include copies of any questionnaires, tests, or other written instruments, instructions, scripts, 
etc., to be used.   
The interviewees will be asked to respond to a series of questions meant to gain information about their emergency 
operations center and the nature of their collaboration and networking relationships with other local emergency 
operations centers.  The interviews will be conducted in a location that is most convenient for the interviewee.  The 
questions were developed using the relevant literature from the fields of emergency management and networks.  The 
information gained from the interviews will be recorded using notes and an audio recorder.  The notes and audio 
recordings will be used to transcribe the interview.  The primary investigator will do the transcribing.  The 
information will then be analyzed for patterns of responses most likely using Spradley DRS. It will also be compared 
to similar studies on interorganizational relationships in emergency management. 
 
4. Will the subjects encounter the possibility of stress or psychological, social, physical, or legal risks that are 
greater than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or 
psychological examinations or tests?    Yes    No 
 
If Yes, please justify your position:  The possible harm to the subjects is due to the possible loss of confidentiality, 
but steps will be taken to minimize this risk.  Another possible harm could be 
revealing more information than they would like, but they will be informed that they 
have the right to refuse to answer any question or to end the interview at any time. 
5. Will medical clearance be necessary for subjects to participate because of tissue or blood sampling, 
administration of substances such as food or drugs, or physical exercise conditioning?     Yes    No 
 





6. Will the subjects be deceived or misled in any way?    Yes    No 
 




7. Will information be requested that subjects might consider to be personal or sensitive?     Yes     No 
 
If Yes, please explain:  The information requested will include information about the operations and relationships 
utilized in the course of his/her duties within in the local emergency operations center. 
 
8. Will the subjects be presented with materials that might be considered to be offensive, threatening, or 
degrading?    Yes   No 
 
If Yes, please explain, including measures planned for intervention if problems occur. 
 
 
9. Will any inducements be offered to the subjects for their participation?    Yes    No 
 
 If Yes, please explain:   
 
NOTE:  If extra course credit is offered, describe the alternative means for obtaining additional credit available to 
those students who do not wish to participate in the research project. 
10. Will a written consent form (and assent form for minors) be used?     Yes    No 
                    
If Yes, please include the form(s).  Elements of informed consent can be found in 45 CFR 46, Section 
116.  Also see the IRB Handbook or webpage http://compliance.vpr.okstate.edu/IRB/consent.aspx .   
 
If No, a waiver of written consent must be obtained from the IRB.  Explain in detail why a written 
consent form will not be used and how voluntary participation will be obtained.  Include any related 
material, such as a copy of a public notice, script, etc., that you will use to inform subjects of all the 
elements that are required in a written consent.  Refer to IRB Handbook or webpage 
http://compliance.vpr.okstate.edu/IRB/consent.aspx.   
   
 
11. Will the data be a part of a record that can be identified with the subject?    Yes   No 
 
 If Yes, please explain:  The interviews will be recorded and transcribed.  In order to protect confidentiality, the 
interviewees’ name will not be written on the tape.  The tape will be coded with a number.  A separate list with the names 
and numbers will be kept apart from the tapes and will be password protected on a computer in a locked university office.   
 
12.  Describe the steps you are taking to protect the confidentiality of the subjects and how you are going to 
advise subjects of these protections in the consent process.   
       The names of interview subjects will be coded in order to protect their confidentiality.  The code and other records 
will be kept separate from documents that could lead to a loss of confidentiality.  The tapes and other records will be kept 
under lock and key in the Center for the Study of Disasters and Extreme Events with access limited to the principal 
investigator and advisor. After the research is complete, the tapes will be destroyed in 2 years or returned to the subjects 
 
13. Will the subject’s participation in a specific experiment or study be made a part of any record available to 
his or her supervisor, teacher, or employer?     Yes    No 
 
       If Yes, please describe:   
 
14. Describe the benefits that might accrue to either the subjects or society.  Note that 45 CFR 46, Section 
46.111(a)(2) requires that the risks to subjects be reasonable in relation to the anticipated benefits.  The investigator 
should specifically state the importance of the knowledge that reasonably may be expected to result from this research. 
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       The most important benefit is the knowledge gained though participation.  The information can be used to improve the 
effectiveness of emergency operations centers, influence planning in local emergency management, and change how 
actors in local emergency management train for multijurisdictional events.  It will also provide the participants a 
chance to reflect, which may enable them to gain professional insights.  The research will also bring attention to an 
area of emergency management that has not been studied at a level commensurate with its importance to emergency 
























Appendix B: Interview Guide 
 
EOC Specific Questions: 
1. How long has your current EOC been in existence? 
2. How long have you been in charge of the EOC in your jurisdiction? 
3. Describe the setup of your EOC? 
a. How large is your EOC? 
i. Number of rooms 
ii. Square footage 
b. How many rooms? 
i. Cubicles? 
c. How is the Operations room arranged? 
i. By function? 
ii. Other 
iii. As for a layout of the EOC. 
4. What agencies or departments are represented in the EOC? 
a. How are agency representatives arranged within the space? 
i. By function? 
ii. Some other way? 
b. What other local governments are represented in your EOC? 
i. Other cities 
ii. The county 
iii. The university 
5. Do you have a back-up EOC? 
a. What kind of facility is the back up EOC? 
i. Mobile EOC 
ii. Another building? 
b. How comparable are your EOC and back-up?  
6. Have you conducted training that included the EOC? 
a. How many training sessions? 
b. Who participated? 
c. What kinds of training. 
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d. What did you learn from the training 
i. Coordination issues 
ii. Communications issues 
7. Have you conducted any exercises that included the EOC 
a. How many exercises? 
b. Were they tabletop exercises or functional exercises? 
c. Who participated in the exercise? 
d. What lessons did you learn from those exercises? 
e. Are there copies of the reports available? 
8. How do you decide to activate your EOC? 
a. Types of situations 
b. Some kind of protocol 
c. When there is a watch? 
d. A warning? 
9. What are the best parts of your EOC? 
a. What works the best? 
b. Something you are really proud of? 
10. What concerns or problems do you have with your EOC? 
a. Noise issues 
b. Space issues 
c. Agency representation 
i. Too much 
ii. Too little 
11. If you could redesign your EOC, what would you do differently? 
Network and Collaboration Questions 
12. Do you work with any other EOCs or EMs? 
a. If yes, skip to #16 
b. If no, go to #13 
13. Why don’t you work with other EOCs or EMs? 
a. Personal differences 
b. Professional differences 
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c. No reason to 
d. No opportunities to 
14. Do you know any other EMs in this area? 
15. Would you like to work with other EOCs or EMs? 
a. Why? 
 
*Ask for each of the EOCs they work with 
Frequency of Director Contact 
16. How often to you meet with your counterpart at each of the EOCs? 
a. Never; a few times a year; about once a month; every few weeks; about once a 
week; several times a week 
17. Would you like to meet with your counterparts more? 
a. Why? 
18. Why do you meet with certain counterparts more than others? 
a. More need? 
b. Higher comfort level? 
Structural Location of Contact Point 
19. Compared to your rank in your own organization, are your counterparts in other 
organizations ranked higher than, lower than, or at about the same level as you in 
their own organization? 
Degree of Formalization 
 
20. Do you have any formal agreements with other EOCs or EMs? 
a. Is so, what kinds of agreements do you have with each? 
i. Memorandums of Understanding, Interagency Agreements 
b. If no, are there any in the works? 
c. If no, why? 
Number of Joint Programs 
21. Do you conduct any joint programs with other EOCs or EMs? 
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a. If so, how many and what kinds of joint programs with each counterpart? 
b. In past joint programs, who has initiated the program? 
c. If no, are there any in the works? 
d. If no, why? 
22. Do you conduct joint exercises or training with other EOCs or EMs? 
a. If so, what kinds of training and exercises are you involved in with each of 
your counterparts? 
b. If no, do you plan to do so in the future? 
c. If no, why? 
Amount of Overlapping Memberships 
Informal ties among people who interact with each other away from their jobs often link 
two organizations. 
23. Do you interact with your counterparts at other EOCs outside of your job? 
a. If so, do you think this makes your working relationship better? 
b. If no, do you think this would improve your working relationship? 
Perceived Interorganizational Coordination 
24. Do you believe you and your counterpart’s activities with regards to the EOC are well 
coordinated? 
a. If yes, why? 
b. If no, why? 
c. If no, how do you think your activities could become better coordinated? 
25. Do you believe your activities and those at other EOCs will be well coordinated in the 
event of a multi-jurisdictional event? 
a. If yes, what leads you to this conclusion? 
b. If no, why? 







Appendix C: Informed Consent Form 
 
Project Name: Networks and Collaboration Among Local Emergency Operations 
Centers 
 
Investigators: Elizabeth Harris, Oklahoma State University 
Purpose: The purpose of the study is to discover how local emergency managers use 
collaboration and networks to provide more effective response to multi-jurisdictional 
emergency and disaster events, especially with respect to emergency operations centers 
(EOCs).   
Procedures: A graduate student from the Oklahoma State University Department of 
Political Science will conduct the one-on-one interview.  The questions will provide you 
an opportunity to explain in your own words how your EOC functions and interacts with 
other EOCs.  The interviews will be taped using an audio recorder.  The interviews will 
last about one hour.  There is also the possibility of contact after the initial interview to 
clarify or confirm information provided in the interview.  After the interviews are 
completed, the information will be analyzed for trends and other information.  The final 
product of the research will be a Master’s thesis. 
Risks of Participation:  The study involves minimal risk to the participant including loss 
of confidentiality and revealing information they did not want to reveal.  Your name and 
title will not be revealed in the final document.   
Benefits of Participation: The research will benefit both the researchers and 
interviewees in several important ways.  The most important benefit is the knowledge 
gained though your participation.  The information can be used to improve the 
effectiveness of emergency operations centers, influence planning in local emergency 
management, and change how actors in local emergency management train for 
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multijurisdictional events.  The interview will also allow the participant to reflect on their 
plans and actions, which may enable them to gain professional insight.  The research will 
also bring attention to an area of emergency management that has not been studied at a 
level commensurate with its importance to emergency response. 
Confidentiality: In order to protect your confidentiality, any documents that may 
identify you as an interviewee will be coded in a way that will protect your name.  The 
code and coded documents will be kept separately under lock and key.  The interview 
tapes will be destroyed after two years or returned to you, the subject.  The records of this 
study will be kept private.  Any written results will discuss group findings and will not 
include information that will identify you.  Research records will be stored securely and 
only researchers and individuals responsible for research oversight will have access to the 
records.  It is possible that the consent process and data collection will be observed by 
research oversight staff responsible for safeguarding the rights and wellbeing of people 
who participate in research. 
Compensation: There will be no extra compensation for participating in this study.   
Contacts: If you have any questions about the research, please contact Elizabeth Harris 
at (918) 521-1954 or Dr. Brenda Phillips at (405) 744-5298.  If you have any questions 
about your rights as a research volunteer, you may contact Dr. Shelia Kennison, IRB 
Chair, 219 Cordell North, Stillwater, OK  74078, (405) 744-1676 or irb@okstate.edu.  
Participants Rights  
  As a volunteer participant, you have the right to refuse to answer any question or end 
the interview at any time without the threat of punishment or penalty.   
Signatures: 
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I have read and fully understand the consent form.  I sign it freely and voluntarily. A 
copy of this form has been given to me. 
 
________________________                  _______________ 
Signature of Participant      Date 
I certify that I have personally explained this document before requesting that the 
participant sign it. 
 
________________________                  _______________ 
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Name: Elizabeth A. Harris                                                          Date of Degree: July, 2009 
  
Institution: Oklahoma State University                      Location: Stillwater, Oklahoma 
 
Title of Study: THE USE OF NETWORKS TO CONNECT LOCAL EMERGENCY 
OPERATIONS CENTERS 
 
Pages in Study: 98                             Candidate for the Degree of Master of Arts 
Major Field: Political Science 
 
Scope and Method of Study:  This study seeks to discover how local emergency 
operations centers in one community connect to provide a coordinated 
multijurisdictional response.  The study is based on a qualitative research design.  
In order to gain data for analysis, the researcher employed interviews, visual 
evidence, and documents.  The data analysis consisted of three phases.  The first 
phase compared the studied EOCs to the existing literature to determine if they 
included structures to meet the six general task areas of EOCs as described by 
Quarantelli (1972; 1978).  The second phase compared the statements of each 
official about their interorganizational relationship to the results of Drabek 
(1987).  The final phase of analysis employed grounded theory to discover the 
conditions that enabled the EOCs to build and maintain their relationship. 
 
Findings and Conclusions:  Overall the research found that the two EOCs did include 
structures or operations that would meet the six general task areas of an EOC, 
which suggests that the EOCs would be effective during an event.  The research 
also found that the two EOCs had formed an integrated interorganizational 
network, which would suggest that the two EOCs would provide a well-
coordinated response during a multijurisdictional event.  In addition, the 
information was analyzed using grounded theory.  From this analysis emerged 
five themes that seem to build and maintain the integrated interorganizational 
network between the city and university.  The five factors are making emergency 
management a priority, the importance of previous relationships, the importance 
of overlapping memberships, the use of WebEOC, and formalizing the 
relationship through mutual aid agreements.  The study concluded that the two 
EOCs studied formed an integrated interorganizational network in order to 
provide a well-coordinated multijurisdictional response.   
 
